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their Treaty rights.
The latter inevitably, among
the
other evils, involves a great loss of prestige;
former would have consequences which I do not
venture to calculate, but hich if the accounts we
receive of the Chinese temper are accurate might
endanger the safety of every foreigner in China.
No policy could be simpler or for its immediate object
more effective. That it would be very bad for China as
well as for the foreigner is clear enough.
who rule Chinese policy take that view?
ill those
If what I have called the 'rear-guard' action of
our diplomacy is destined, through no fault of its own,
to suffer a gradual defeat, how are we to strengthen it? I am sure the Cabinet would absolutely rule out any
serious military effort conducted by the Powers either
singly or together. The objections to it are so obvious
that I need not dwell upon them. We may have to land
marines to extricate women and children; but the idea
of landing an army to fight a united China, or a united
Southern China, is absurd,
A blockade is not absurd in the same way or to the
same degree. The international aspects of it may present
difficulties of which I am not in a position to speak.
There may be aval difficulties of a technical and
administrative order; but doubtless these can be overcome.
The obvious objection to it is that it would (at least temporarily) ruin our trade, and hurt us even more than
it would hurt the Chinese. But it has to be observed,
in the first place, that blockade
an act of war
is
a weapon which we ought not to use until it is evident that, whatever we do, our economic position is already temporarily
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