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2.
In introducing this Report to the Committee of Imperial Defence. the Chief of the Naval Staff made the following comments :—
Lord Beatty said that as the defence of British interests in China had always been mainly a Naval responsibility, the situation in that country was of greater importance to the Admiralty than to the other Services. If it was correct to assume that the situation in China was so grave that an upheaval similar to the Bolshevik upheaval in Russia might take place, then it was inconceivable that any of the military measures recommended in the Report, such as the despatch of one Brigade from India, would be of any use; in fact, it would probably be harmful, in that it would be calculated to incite Chinese feeling against Great Britain. If military operations in China were to be undertaken, Japan was the only Power in a position to undertake such operations, and though this raised a question of big imperial policy beyond his own province, he personally was inclined to think it advisable, if the situation in China were going to deteriorate to a great extent, to ask Japan to take such
action.
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The Committee of Imperial Defence recommended that in the circumstances then existing no reinforcements of the troops in Hong-Kong should take place, although the General Staff were asked to enquire into the cost of accommodation. (See Minutes of 202nd Meeting, held on the 22nd July, 1925.)
3. In March 1926. in again reviewing the situation in China in the light of the disturbed conditions which then existed at Canton (C.L.D. Paper No. 677-B), we invited attention to the provisions of our earlier Report quoted above (C.I.D. Paper No. 617-B).
4. Since that time, considerable naval reinforcements have been sent to the China Station, including the aircraft carrier "Hermes," but the new gun-boats will not be ready before the autumn.
On the 15th December, 1926, it was decided to send a military reinforcement of one British battalion from Gibraltar, which is due to arrive on the 4th February. 1927. In the meantime, the Indian battalion at Hong Kong is held ready at short notice to proceed to Shanghai, and may leave at any moment.
THE PRESENT SITUATION.
The
5. In the last few months the situation has very much deteriorated. further and serious disturbances which we apprehended in June 1925 have arisen. The Nationalist Government, working to a considerable extent under Bolshevist influence, has obtained control of the greater part of China south of the Yangtse. Two of the British Concessions on the Yangtse (Hankow and Kiukiang) have been evacuated. Shanghai is menaced in the near future.
It is to the safety of the British and foreign Concessions, and more especially to that of Shanghai, that we address ourselves mainly in this Report.
6. Our first Report on this subject (C.I.D. Paper No. 617-B) contained a list of the Treaty Ports in China, which number 49 in all. The only Ports, however, to which attention need be drawn at the present time are the following, at which British Concessions exist: Amoy, Canton, Chinkiang, Hankow, Kiukiang, Shanghai, Tientsin.
THE SMALLER CONCESSION PORTS.
7. Leaving the important question of Shanghai to be dealt with later in this Report, we wish to point out that the protection of the smaller Concessions must, as indicated in our first Report (C.1.D. Paper No. 617-B) devolve upon the Naval Forces. The Navy, however, cannot as a general rule do more than afford protection against mob violence. If it is a question of dealing with organised military forces evacuation will usually be the only course. Hankow and Kiukiang, as already mentioned, have been evacuated and are in the occupation of the Chinese Nationalist Forces. Even if, as Eugene Chen appears to wish, these Concessions are returned to their proper owners, we could not recommend any plans based on the assumption that they can be defended against the Nationalist Forces or against anything more
than mob violence.
8. Taking the remainder of the minor Concession Ports mentioned above in order, the situation at each is as follows :-
A moy.
9.
The principal part of the Concession is, we are informed, situated on an island and is easily defensible. We were informed by Captain Lake that if a company of infantry could be spared from Hong Kong it might be able to hold this Concession. We have not, however, sufficient local knowledge to make a definite recommendation on this subject, and we think that the arrangements at Amoy had best be left to the Naval Commander-in-chief in consultation with the military authorities at Hong Kong, and the local Consular representative.
Canton.
10. The situation in regard to the defence of the Shameen, where the foreign Concessions at Canton are situated, are fully set forth in a Memorandum by the General Staff attached to C.I.D. Paper No. 722-B. the conclusions of which are summarised in the last paragraph as follows:-
"(a.) Any action taken with regard to Shameen, which involves military consequences, will have to be taken in co-operation with, and with the prior agreement of, the French, who have a definite share in the foreign concession.
(b.) The evacuation of Shameen will almost certainly involve its looting and possibly its destruction by the Cantonese.
(c.) The institution of a blockade without the evacuation of Shameen will almost certainly produce a demand for military protection. If this demand is to be met, a garrison of two companies of infantry, with machine guns, and two sections of pack artillery is considered the minimum that could safeguard itself and also the concession.
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(d) Owing to navigational difficulties, a garrison in Shameen could quite easily be cut off and marooned.
CC
(e.) If Shameen is cut off from the outside world, a combined naval, military and air operation would have to be undertaken to relieve it. It is not impossible that such an operation would land us in extensive commitments.
(f) The operation described in (e) would constitute an act of war against China.
(g.) Unless His Majesty's Government is prepared to face the above liabilities, the evacuation of Shameen should be a necessary preliminary to the institution of a blockade."
Chinkiang.
11.
At Chinking there is one British destroyer. An American destroyer is also stationed there, whilst at Nanking, which is about 50 miles higher up the River, there are two British cruisers and one more British destroyer. These ships could provide a landing party of about 300 rifles. This force should be sufficient for the maintenance of order against the local population, but in the event of the arrival of Chinese Nationalist troops the concession might, in circumstances similar to those which arose at Hankow and Kiukiang, have to be evacuated.
Tientsin.
12.
In our earlier Report (C.I.D. Paper No. 617-B) we stated that the inter- national forces at Tientsin amounted to 138 officers and 2,978 other ranks, including British forces of 24 officers and 673 other ranks. We have not had time to check these figures in detail, but we have no reason to suppose that they have altered materially. The original purpose of these forces was to protect the Concession at Tientsin, to keep open communications with the Legations at Pekin, and to provide guards at those Legations. We doubt if they would be able to achieve this object in any grave circumstances.
The said forces are sufficient only for the maintenance of order in times of popular disturbance, and would be in a position of grave danger if exposed to attack by a large organised Chinese force. Co-operation by ships at Tientsin is not practicable. The only source from which reinforcements could be obtained at Tientsin is Japan.
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