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"(d.) Owing to navigational difficulties, a garrison in Shameen could quite easily be cut off and marooned.
"(e.) If Shameen is cut off from the outside world, a combined naval, military and air operation would have to be undertaken to relieve it. It is not impossible that such an operation would land us in extensive commitments.
K
China.
K
(f.) The operation described in (e) would constitute an act of war against
(9.) Unless His Majesty's Government is prepared to face the above liabilities, the evacuation of Shameen should be a necessary preliminary to the institution of a blockade."
Our general recommendation in our last report (paragraph 28 (i) (e) of C.O.S.-59) was that
The measures to be taken for the protection of Shameen or for its evacuation can only be decided in accordance with the situation at the moment, and must be left to the men on the spot
"
5. The present situation, as reported in the telegrams in the Appendices, is as follows:-
The local press is working up an agitation over the incidents at Hankow. The General Labour Union has held a meeting to discuss taking the Shameen concessions. The meeting was stopped by the police, but the agitation continues. The British Acting Consul-General and the French Consul have warned the Cantonese Ministry for Foreign Affairs that an attempt by the mob to seize the island will be repelled by force. The British Consul-General realises, however, that this entails firing, though only in the last extremity, and that then the Cantonese troops might take part. In that event, it might be impossible to evacuate immediately, especially as the French are determined to hold their concession to the last, and we could not leave them in the lurch. The Acting Consul-General, who thinks the Nationalist Government cannot want serious trouble at Canton, the base of their campaign and the source of most of their money and supplies, asks for authority to tell the local Chinese General in Command, in as friendly and tactful a manner as possible, that if we are attacked by troops we shall shell or bomb vital points and finally blockade Canton. In such a case, he thinks the French and possibly the Americans and Japanese, would be with us and help to defend the island. Meanwhile, the General Officer Commanding at Hong Kong reports that he has been considering the question of the Shameen in consultation with the Navy, and they are of the definite opinion that it should not be evacuated, and the Governor concurs in this opinion. The Navy assure him that communication can be kept open at any time of the year by routes which avoid the defended channel. Should evacuation eventually become imperative, they consider it highly improbable that these routes would be blocked. The General Officer Commanding is prepared, if necessary, to send one company and four machine guns to Shameen. In that event, the Navy propose to block the entrance to the river with the "Hermes" and one cruiser, the former being used for bombing if desirable.
6. The reported intention of the French to hold their concession to the last is a new factor. The Foreign Office are rather doubtful as to the accuracy of this report, and are in communication with the French Government on the subject. In regard to this matter we can only point out the great importance of concerting our arrangements with the French, both between the Governments and the local authorities concerned.
7. In dealing with the actual proposals of the Acting Consul-General and the local Naval and Military authorities, we base our recommendations on the assumption that the policy of His Majesty's Government is to avoid any action which might precipitate hostilities with the Chinese military forces and so unite the whole of China in a war against us, but at the same time British interests, wherever situated in China, must be protected up to the point where further resistance will inevitably result in open hostilities with Chinese troops.
8. We feel that the threat which the Acting Consul-General proposes to make to the local Chinese General in Command at Canton, if translated into action, would be calculated to precipitate hostilities and might hasten the crisis at Shanghai which it is desired to avert or in any case to postpone as long as possible. In these circumstances we think that the threat should not be made.
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9. The report that it would be possible to keep open communication between Hong Kong and Shameen at any time of the year by alternative routes which avoid the necessity of forcing the defended main river channel is of considerable importance, insomuch as this shows that the view of the late Commodore in this respect is confirmed by his successor. In these circumstances we feel bound to accept the opinion of the man on the spot. This in no way modifies the opinion expressed by the General Staff in C.I.D. Paper No. 722-B, quoted above in paragraph 3, that if Shameen is cut off from the outside world a combined Naval, Military and Air operation would have to be undertaken to relieve it, but decreases the probability of this contingency. We think it not impossible, however, that the Cantonese Govern- ment may have obtained some mines for use in the river. In general we think that this information is of importance to the local Naval, Military and Consular authorities in deciding their action in such circumstances as may arise, rather than as affecting the principles which His Majesty's Government should lay down for their guidance.
10. We recommend that the instructions to the local Naval, Military and Civil authorities should be guided by the following principles :-
(a.) The policy of His Majesty's Government is to avoid becoming engaged in active hostilities with the Chinese military forces, since this might unite the whole of China in a war against us. They must, therefore, avoid action calculated to precipitate this contingency.
(b.) Subject to this paramount consideration, the Concessions are to be protected against mob violence to the utmost extent possible with the forces available locally, but, if the continued occupation of the Concessions is impossible without action calculated to involve hostilities with the Chinese forces, the men on the spot must have full discretion to evacuate.
11.
We recognise that these instructions place a heavy responsibility on those who have to take a decision, whether to hold on or to evacuate. Their position in this respect is similar to that of an officer commanding a rearguard, where the enemy's advance guard consists of the mob and the main body is the Cantonese army. They must therefore be given wide discretion.
12. Subject to the above, and to the consent of the Governor, we recommend that the General Officer Commanding at Hong Kong, in consultation with the local Naval authorities and the acting Consul-General at Canton, should be authorised, if the situation becomes serious, to send to Shameen such troops as he thinks necessary and as he can spare, having due regard to the security of Hong Kong and to the call which may at any moment arise from Shanghai for the despatch of the Indian Battalion.
13. We cannot recommend, however, that authority should be given to block the entrance to the river, as proposed, much less the bombing of Canton, at present.
2, Whitehall Gardens, S. W. 1, January 14, 1927.
(Signed)
APPENDIX I.
H. TRENCHARD. G. F. MILNE.
F. L. FIELD (for C.N.S.).
[Paraphrase Telegram from General Officer Commanding, Hong Kong, to the War Office, No. 1279, dated January 13, 1927.]
NAVY and myself have been considering question of non-evacuation of Shameen. We are of definite opinion it should not be evacuated and Governor concurs in this opinion. Navy assure me it would be possible to keep communication open at any time of year viâ following alternative routes Moneypenny Creek and Hamilton and Lupu Creek. Should it eventually become imperative to evacuate this could be carried out viâ same routes. Navy are of opinion possibility of these three routes being blocked is highly improbable. Considered by both Navy and myself unnecessary to attempt to force main river channel viâ Bocca and Dane Island forts.
If situation