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3
5. In our previous Report (C.I.D. Paper No. 756-B) we have already set out the strength of the force which we consider is necessary for the defence of Shanghai, viz. :-
"To protect the Concessions at Shanghai by military means against Nationalist troops that might be brought against it in the near future, a force of at least 1 Division and one squadron of aeroplanes would be necessary, and would have to be despatched without delay. This should be an international force with a preponderance of Japanese, and commanded by a Japanese officer, in view of the fact that Japan alone can provide large forces at short notice. In the present circumstances we must. in fact, rely primarily on Japan to protect our interests in Shanghai. Owing to the magnitude of British interests, British participation on the scale of a mixed brigade, with a proportion of naval aircraft, although it may be late, is essential. These forces should be additional to those required to control the population."`
It will be seen, therefore, that our estimate of one Division corresponds to the estimate of the Naval Commander-in-Chief in his telegram of the 12th January.
6. We emphasised in our last Report the importance of securing international co-operation in the defence of Shanghai, and we understand that conversations have been proceeding with the Japanese Staff in this connection, the results of which, however, are not yet available.
7.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.
Our Conclusions and Recommendations in regard to the defence of Shanghai in the present circumstances may be summarised as follows:--
(a.) If Shanghai is to be secured, it is of the first importance that the troops for this purpose should be despatched at once, otherwise they may arrive on the scene too late. Any delay in this connection is dangerous. (b.) The following British troops should be despatched to Shanghai at once :---
(i.) One mixed Brigade from India.
(ii.) 1,000 Marines."
(iii) The First Cruiser Squadron (which can supply a landing-party
of 1,000 rifles).
(e.) That recommendation (b) is on the understanding that the remainder of the units required to complete the Division which is necessary for the defence of Shanghai will be provided by other nationalities. If other nationalities are not prepared to provide the remainder of the Division we shall have to provide a complete Division ourselves.
8. We understand that arrangements are being made for the supply of such necessities as barbed wire. ammunition, &c.
9. Provided that authority is given to-day to carry out the moves recommended in paragraph 7 above, it is estimated that the troops concerned will be available for action at Shanghai in 30 to 32 days from this date. Our latest information is to the effect that the earliest date on which the Chinese Nationalist Forces can arrive at Shanghai is 30 days from to-day. It will be seen, therefore, that in order to ensure effective intervention on our part the necessary orders for the move of our troops must be given to-day.
USE OF TEAR GAS IN CHINA.
10. In addition to the matters dealt with above we also considered the Memorandum by the Naval Staff on the possible use of Tear Gas in China (C.I.D. Paper No. 760-B). In his Memorandum dated the 20th December, 1926 (C.I.D. Paper No. 754-B), the Secretary of State for War described the widespread activities of Soviet Russia in connection with the production of war gases. In view of the close connection known to exist between the Chinese Nationalists and Soviet Russia, the use of gas by the former in any conflict that may arise between them and ourselves would therefore be a contingency that must be regarded as probable. It also appears unlikely that any decision by us to refrain from using gas would be taken into consideration by the Chinese if they had stocks of gas available for use.
The question for more immediate consideration, however, is whether the use of tear gas should be permitted against mobs. We are definitely of opinion that it is
more humane and, under most circumstances, just as effective as the use of lethal weapons.
of
In the Washington Agreement and the recent Geneva Protocol on the subject gas it is laid down that gas is not to be used in war; tear gas is included in this prohibition. That this prohibition does not apply in peace time is, however, apparently the view of certain nations as authentic information of its use by France and the United States in quelling civil disturbances has been received.
We recognise, nevertheless, that a distinction must be drawn between the use by a Government of gas against its own nationals and against those of another Power.
Tear gas of a suitable kind could be obtained either at home or in the open market in America without undue delay, and, if its use were sanctioned, we are informed that arrangements could be made without difficulty for sending a special gas unit to China.
After taking into consideration the many factors affecting its use, we unanimously recommend that authority should be given for gas to be used in China against the mob, subject to the issue of very definite instructions as to the circum- stances under which it may be employed.
2. Whitehall Gardens, S.W, 1,
January 17, 1927.
(Signed)
APPENDIX.
BEATTY.
H. TRENCĦARD. G. F. MILNE.
Decypher Telegram from Commander-in-Chief, China, to Admiralty, No. 728, dated January 12, 1927,
H.M.S.
H.M.S.
**Hawkins."
ADDRESSED Admiralty (No. 728); repeated to
Hawkins repeat message to Governor, Hong Kong. My appreciation of position in Shanghai, by which mean the foreign occupied areas and the harbour from Shanghai to Wusung, is as follows: The conditions since fall of Hankow and Kiukiang, referred to in my No. 725, have materially altered all previous appreciations. At the present time there is nothing to stop an advance in force of the Cantonese army. I look on their reverse in Chekiang in the last two days merely as incidents [? and their] ultimate advance on Shanghai as an [? absolute] certainty. The volunteer force of Shanghai is entirely inadequate for defence purposes, and unless it is very materially increased [the] [? corrupt group] of Shanghai is inevitable and will take place in practically the same manner as that of Hankow and Kiukiang. I consider a fully-equipped division, repeat division, is urgently required for the defence of Shanghai, and that, moreover, it should be despatched with the least possible delay. Urgency of situation calls for immediate action, and delay disastrous. Under the present conditions the Cantonese army can arrive in the vicinity of Shanghai within thirty days. The defence of Shanghai will be purely a military operation; the naval landing parties and volunteer corps will be used for maintaining order inside the settlement. I would point out that should this division be forthcoming], in addition to disposing of present menace to Shanghai, it would lead to eventual restoration of concessions at Hankow and Kiukiang and, above all, to the re-establishment of British prestige. Moreover, the presence of a strong British force in Shanghai] would without doubt encourage our wavering allies to follow suit and thus afford them the opportunity to join] with us in dealing with situation, which at present they are inclined to avoid as being mess of our own making. The alternatives] to this proposal are: (i) peaceful evacuation of concession at an early date; (ii) evacuation under similar or worse conditions than existed at Hankow and possibly under fire. I have consulted Consul-General, Shanghai, in this matter, and he is in entire agreement, though [he] adheres to his previously expressed opinion that evacuation would prove physically impossible in practice. In the meantime. I concur that the battalion now in readiness at Hong Kong should be sent forthwith and accommodated ashore.
Minister at Peking is being similarly informed.
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