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landed.
This course was felt to be open to some of the
objections to the first proposal, and it was pointed out
that Mr. O'Malley (though avowedly not acting under
instructions) had made suggestions to Eugene Chen on
these lines on the occasion of the latter's refusal to
sign the agreements (Mr. O'Malley (Hankow) No.36.of
1st February).
A third suggestion was that, following on the Japanese
advice that British troops should not be landed at
Shanghai (Sir J.Tilley, No.61 of February 3rd) a telegram
should be sent to Tokyo to the effect that we were now in
course of obtaining a defensive force in the East which
was adequate for any emergency likely to arise; that
we were anxious not to cause any risk to Japanese
nationals in other parts of China by landing the troops;
that if the Japanese Government desired us to keep the bulk
of our forces at Hong Kong we would be glad to do so
pending consultation with them, always supposing that
there was no emergency at Shanghai, and that our
representatives in China regarded this as a safe course.
A corresponding communication, mutatis mutandis, would be
made to Washington. If this policy were adopted it wAB
proposed to make no further communication to Eugene Chen.
On a review of these proposals and several
variants of them, the Cabinet agreed
(a) That the Secretary of State for Foreign At fairs
should telegraph the two latter alternatives to
Sir Miles Lampson and invite his views on the whole
situation (Appendix III).
(b) That the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
should also consult Sir Miles Lampson (1) as to
whether the lending or accommodation of additional
troops in Shanghai would meet with difficulties
from the Consuls-General of other Powers or from
the