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the Municipality and by the Foreign Consular Body there.
On this point the Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs had already asked for further information.
(Foreign Office telegram No.27 of February 3rd to Sir
S. Barton).
Thus,
while the particular emergency for which
the troops had been despatched had not arisen at Shanghai,
all the British representatives in China (with the
exception of Mr. Teichman, of the Peking Legation, who is
at Hankow with Mr. O'Malley but whose views Wr. O'Melley
does not support) appeared to be opposed to any
diversion of troops on the basis of possible assurances
by Eugene Chen; but the Japanese and United States
Governments, whom the Cabinet were anxious not to
antagonise, were apprehensive as to the possible
reactions of a landing of our troops at Shanghai.
with reference to the phrase in Mr. O'Malley's
telegram No.234, quoted in (6) above, the Secretary of
tate for Foreign Affairs said that there could be no
question of the Government gambling in the lives of the
British at Shanghai. There was already at Shanghai a
force of 4,000 men - the number considered necessary to
control the mob; the troops had been sent because of the
danger of an immediate advance on Shanghai by the
Nationalist Armies; but whilst our advance troops were now
in Far Eastern waters, the Nationalist Army was no nearer
to Shanghai.
As regards the signature of the agreement and the
guarantee, the Secretary of State explained that his view
was that throughout the negotiations there had been a
struggle between Borodin and the Bolshevist influences on
the one side, who were opposed to any agreement, and the
more mo derate opinion, represented by Chen, which desired
to accept so liberal an offer. The value of the
conclusion of the agreement would lie in the proof that the
Moderat