137
The
there are large numbers of Japane se (Tokyo telegram
No.61 of February 3rd and earlier telegrams).
United States of America were known to some extent to
share the views of Japan.
or
(6) Bir Miles Lampson had been advised that we would
on no account give way to the Cantonese threats,
show any vacillation as to the destination of the
Shanghai force at this stage, but (evidently not
realising how near the Indian mixed Brigade is to
Shanghai) had proposed to postpone the decision as to
landing it at Shanghai or at Hong-Kong. Mr. O'Malley
(telegram No.234 of February 3rd) doubted if Chen could
give satisfactory assurances or whether the Government
he represents has the power to fulfil them, and
considered that our interests andpopulation at
Shanghai were too large to gamble with.
(Mr.O'Malley
(Hankow) No.41 of February 3rd). The Governor of Hong
Kong (in a private telegram to the Secretary of State)
was opposed to concessions to Chen and the Commodore,
Hong Kong, (in a telegram to the Admiralty) stated that
the diversion to Hong Kong of the Suffolk regiment
previously decided on, would have political effects.
The Consul General at Shanghai had expressed the view
that any change of policy would have a disastrous effect
locally, and might prejudice the situation in general,
(Shanghai telegram No.29 of 31st January).
(7) The diversion of troops to Wei-hai-wei was
deprecated by Sir Miles Lampson as calculated to
all China (Pekin telegram No.235, February 3rd.).
(8) According to a message received during the meeting,
the Secretary of State for War, the whole British
division could, if necessary, be accommodated in Hong
Kong.
(9) AC Commodation for a brigade was available on
British property at Shanghai, but there was doubt as
to the reception which the troops would be given by
the