indicate that ample international forces for the
136
maintenance of order are at or within easy reach of
Shanghai.
(3) Eugene Chen on February lat at the last ncment
refused to sign the agreement which had been reached
in regard to the British settlements at Hankow and
Kiukiang unless we refrained from landing our forces
at Shanghai. But he has not carried out his vague
promise to give Mr. O'Malley in writing an assurance
that the Nationalist Government would not countenance
an alteration in the status of the British Concession
and international settlements except by negotiation.
There was evidence also that Chen's reasons were a
pretext, as he had known of our intention to send
troops to Shanghai since the beginning of the negotia-
tions, and had admitted that he had found points in the
agreements which needed revision (Mr. O'Malley's
telegramsfrom Hankow Nos.32 of January 31st, 35 and
36 of February 1st.).
(4) Chen may have been encouraged to seize upon the
troop movementa as an excuse for not signing by the
published resolution of the Joint Labour Council and
speeches by certain Labour leaders. There was evidence
that British public opinion, while supporting the
action taken by the Goverment to protect British
lives in China, was very anxious for a friendly
settlement.
(5) Sir Miles Lampson's telegram indicated that the
outward opposition of Northern China to the advent
of British troops at Shanghai need probably not be
taken too seriously (Peking Telegram No.234 of
February 4th). But the Japanese Goverment would prefer that British troops should not be landed at Shanghai
and were anxious as to the possible results in
stirring up anti-foreign sentiments in China, where
there