119
(ii) The above telegram (No.247) followed closely on two
telegrams from Sir Miles Lampson, both despatched only twenty
. minutes before, which, taken together, constituted a reply to an
earlier telegram sent by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
asking for his appreciation of the military situation at Shanghai in certain contingencies (Foreign Office No.85 to Sir Miles Lampson January 29th). The first of these (No.245), despatched at 7.40
p.m. on February 5th, forwarded a telegram from the Consul-General, Shanghai, prepared in consultation with the naval Commander-in-Chief, and, in the contingencies mentioned in Foreign Office No.85, advoca-
ted landing one Brigade and three Battalions at Shanghai at all costs, and expressed the opinion that any weakening relative to the landing of troops at Shanghai would be disastrous. (Note. The last two paragraphs of this telegram indicated a misapprehension of British policy and had elicited a reply from the Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs pointing out that the troops had been despatched to Shanghai as a precaution and for protection of life, and that they
were not to be used as a bargaining counter with the Chinese or others (No.114 to Peking). in the second telegram (No.246), des-
patched from Peking at the same time as No.245, Sir Miles Lampson
pointed out that all depends on the circumstances at Shanghai, on
which our local authorities must advise. But he insisted on the
importance of retaining our troops in the Far East and of remaining
firm in our determination to defend ourselves if driven to it, ended with a warning that if Sun Chuan-fang is defeated the crisis may occur almost without notice at Shanghai before there would be
time to move forces from Hong Kong.
and
(iii) As regards the apprehensions of the Japanese and
American Governments as to the reaction of the landing of British troops at Shanghai on their nationals in the interior (Tokyo telegram No.61; Washington telegram No.61; and Foreign Office telegram to Peking No.108), Sir Miles Lampson replied that no such thought had ever occurred to the Japanese Minister (Peking telegram
No.259), and that the American Minister did not perceive any greater danger to the lives of Americans in the interior than may in the
ordinary