91
The militery questions before the Cabinet, then,
were as follows :-
(1) Should the Indian troops be sent back to
(11)
India on the arrival of the two British
Brigade s?
Should the suspensi n of the naval
Com an der-in-Chief's order for the second
Brigade to proceed to Shanghai be lifted?
On the political side the Cabinet had before them
Mr.O'Malley's telegra No.74, of February 15th, to Peking,
giving particulara of the second breakdown of his
negotiations with Eugene Chen, and Mr.Lampson's commentary
thereon (Peking telegram No.296 of February 17th).
From these telegrams it appeared that Eugene
Chen professed to be ready to sign the agreements in regard
to Pankow and Kiukiang concessions, as well as to give
assurances not to use force or to countenance the use of force
to effect changes in the status or the concessions and
international settlements, but that, in addition to a protest
against the landing of troops at Shanghai, after the
signature he insisted on issuing a statement (apparently to
be addressed to the world at large rather than to this
country in particuler) to the effect that no Chinese
authorities except the Cantonese Nationalist Government were
entitled to negotiate with foreign Powers regarding
settlements (For text of proposed statement see Appendix).
It was not clear whether this was intended merely as a formal
protest or whether Eugene Chen's signature would be
conditional on our pre acceptance of this latter statement,
latter being an impossible condition, as ncgotiations have
already been opened with the Peking Cabinet.
Mr. O'Malley and Mr. Lampson appeared to think
the
that when it came to the point Mr. Chen would still refuse to
aign, but were opposed to the signature of the agreement in
the circumstances.
The Cabinet, however, agreed unanimously