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and the Canton Governments, but this was rejected on examination as being tantamount to recognition of both Governments and ultimately it was decided that I should hand copies to no one. Dr. Koo, who had of course seen the questions asked in Parliament on the subject, himself raised the question of my credentials at my first interview with him and I explained to him my instructions. At one time I thought that he intended to make difficulties over the question, but when returning my call he made no further allusion to it and he has probably decided to leave the matter in abeyance, at any rate for the present. It is probable, however, that as soon as he has formed his new Cabinet, which I understand he has been asked by Chang Tso-lin to do, he will raise the question of credentials again.
5. Interest in the north has centred on the plans and intentions of Chang Tso-lin, who arrived in Tien-tsin from Mukden in the first half of November. It was generally expected that Marshal Chang, having waited for the collapse of Wu Pei-fu's Administration, would proceed forthwith to Peking, to reorganise the Government with his nominees, and even place himself at its head as Provisional President or Chief Executive. Indecision and delay, due perhaps to divided counsels amongst his advisers and supporters, have, however, so far characterised Marshal Chang's actions since he left Mukden, and it was not until a month and a half later that he arrived in Peking towards the end of December; and it still remains to be seen whether he really has any constructive plans for the re-establishment of a Government.
6. In the meantime events were moving rapidly on the Yang-tsze, where, as reported in paragraph 4 of Sir Ronald Macleay's despatch above referred to. bostilities had opened at the end of September between Sun Chuan-fang and the Cantonese. Sun poured troops from Kiangsu, Chekiang and Anhui into Kiangsi under the supreme command of his most trusted general, Lu Hsiang-t'ing, and despatched other forces up the river towards Hankow, himself proceeding to Kiukiang to superintend the operations of his armies. At first the better-equipped army of Sun dealt three successive blows to Chiang Kai-shek's army, costing the latter some 20.000 casualties and driving them back from Nanchang towards their communications in Hunan. If these victories had been followed up a general collapse of the Kuo Min-tang armies would probably have resulted from the threat to their base at Changsha; but, as usual in China, a policy of inaction allowed the initiative to pass from the hands of Sun into those of Chiang, who, by propaganda and by infiltration of small parties into the battle zone, was soon in a position to turn the tables on his adversary. Before the middle of November Sun discovered the Nanchang Kiukiang Railway to be cut and the Kuo Min-tang forces at the gates of Kiukiang. In a panic, he himself headed the flight, leaving his forces to find their way back to Kiangsu and Chekiang, thus totally evacuating the Province of Kiangsi, which passed under the control of the Cantonese.
7. Sun Ch'uan-fang, who had been originally a subordinate officer in Wu Pei-fu's armies, had hitherto consistently professed at least a nominal adherence to Marshal Wu, and had sent a representative to join the Cabinet set up by Wu in Peking in the summer. Moreover, a year before, in the late autumn of 1925, Sun had declared war on the Fengtien leaders, then in occupation of Nanking and the Shanghai region, and had expelled them from Kiangsu by force, a state of armed peace having since prevailed between him and his Northern neighbour, Chang Tsung-ch'ang, the Fengtien Governor of Shantung. It was, therefore, a matter of some surprise and speculation when Sun in the latter half of November paid a sudden and unexpected visit to Chang Tso-lin at Tien-tsin, accompanied only by a few bodyguards. What exactly passed during his stay in Tien-tsin is not known, but his visit was generally interpreted by Chinese opinion as involving his abdication from his independent position in Central China, and his acceptance of the over- lordship of the Manchurian Generalissimo. As the result of the conferences of Northern leaders, mostly of the Fengtien party, which now took place at Tientsin. it was shortly afterwards announced that a definite agreement had now been reached for a combined offensive against the armies of the Kuo Min-tang, while it was later reported that the details of the arrangements come to provided that Sun Ch'uan-fang should surrender to Chang Tsung-chang the whole of Northern Kiangsu, and confine himself to the control and defence of Chekiang and the Shanghai area. Sun thereupon returned to Nanking, and Chang Tsung-chang's troops immediately began to move south along the Tien-tsin-Pukow Railway. Their further advance into Kiangsu was soon after halted for a time, outwardly on account, it was said, of objections raised by Wu Pei-fu; but also, it seems, on account of opposition manifested by local public bodies in Kiangsu, who were rumoured to have given it
to be understood that they would sooner see their province overrun by the Nationalist armies than given over to the depredations of Chang Tsung-chang's notorious soldiery from Shantung. Eventually, however, Chang Tsung-chang himself, accom- panied by strong bodyguards, arrived in Nanking in the third week in December, while his troops moved down into North Kiangsu to replace the forces of Sun Ch'uan-fang.
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8. The next move by the Northern leaders was the announcement early in December of the creation of the An-Kuo-Chün ( army for the pacification of the country irreverently known by some of my more flippant colleagues as the Salvation Army) under Chang Tso-lin as generalissimo and Chang Tsung-chang, Sun Chuan-fang, Yen Hsi-shan (the Governor of Shansi) and other Northern leaders as vice-commanders, accompanied by the usual advertisement in the press of their military plans for the annihilation of the Reds. It was significant, however, that there was no mention in these arrangements of the name of Wu Pei-fu, who, while he now professes to regard Chang Tso-lin as an ally, could not be expected to subordinate himself to the latter's leadership.
9. Marshal Wu has indeed proved a considerable thorn in the side of the An-Kuo-Chun, in view of his occupation of Northern Honan and his stubborn refusal so far to yield place to Chang Tso-lin's forces, which have advanced down the Peking-Hankow Railway to the borders of Honan, or accept their co-operation on the terms they desire. A glance at the map will show the strategic importance to the Fengtien high command of Chengchow (Wu's headquarters), situated at the junction of the East to West Lunghai Railway with the Peking-Hankow line, and the vital necessity to them of occupying it before engaging their forces seriously on the middle Yang-tsze. The difficulty of the situation from the Fengtien point of view is increased by the fact that Wu's forces, though still nominally 80,000 to 100.000 strong, are of small military value and are notoriously unreliable, while his subordinate generals, and notably Chin Yün-ao, are known to have small sympathy with their former enemies in the Fengtien armies and to have made overtures to the South. Wu Pei-fu's apparently intransigent and obstructive attitude towards his Fengtien allies, while typical of his character and past record, may in this case have been at least partly due to these considerations. It is now, at the end of the year, reported that the situation has been cleared up by the dismissal of Chin Yün-ao from his command, but it remains to be seen whether this has been really effected. It is expected that eventually the main attack of Chang Tso-lin's forces will be directed on Hupei down the Kin-Han line; but whether Wn Pei-fu will be relegated to West Honan to deal with the Kuo Min-chun, or whether his armies will take part in the main attack, remains to be settled between the leaders.
10. Developments in the South during the three months under review will be reported on more fully by His Majesty's consuls in Central and Southern China, but the most notable event has been the transfer of the seat of the Kuo Min-tang Government from Canton to Wuchang, which took place in December. At the same time, the Kuo Min-tang, after their successful occupation of Kiangsi, have extended their control over the greater part of Fukien, where the Northern forces occupying that province in the interests of Marshal Sun Chuan-fang dissolved before the Southern advance with little or no fighting. Chekiang, now surrounded on two sides by Kuo Min-tang influence, has also been penetrated to some extent and appears likely to fall also in the near future into their hands.
11. The general political and military position at the close of the year may be summed up as follows. Chang Tso-lin is in Peking and is credited with the intention of re-establishing a Central Government in the Northern capital, which remains, however, for the time being to all intents and purposes without any Government at all. Chang himself controls Manchuria and the metropolitan Province of Chihli and the adjacent territories of Inner Mongolia, and indirectly. through his former subordinate, Chang Tsung-ch'ang, the Province of Shantung. His allies, Sun Chuan-fang and Yen Hsi-shan, the former still controlling the Lower Yang-tsze region and the latter the Province of Shansi, have nominally accepted his leadership, but both are understood to be quite prepared to come to terms with the Kuo Min-tang if they can do so. Wu Pei-fu, who retains control of Northern Honan, also professes to be in alliance with Marshal Chang, but insists on retaining complete liberty of action, and impedes rather than assists the latter's plans. In opposition to this loosely welded block of individual Northern leaders, bound together by momentary ties of self-interest, stands the Kuo Min-tang Govern- ment, now established at Wuchang, and professing to control the Provinces of Kuangtung, Kuangsi, Hunan, Kiangsi, Fukien, Hupei, parts of Chekiang, and,
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