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APPENDIX No. II.
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Minute by Mr. Stark Toller on Proposal to Blockade the Province of Szechuan.
IT is clear that what is proposed is a blockade of the whole province of Szechuan, and not just of the town of Chungking. As Szechuan, which is roughly the size of Germany, has, for practical purposes, only one outlet, the Yangtse, the blockade project is very tempting, particularly as the natural configuration of the country would make it an easy task to bar the Yangtse with a very small force. On the other hand, a blockade of Szechuan would have to be continued for a very long time to inconvenience the people, as the province is practically self-supporting. The effect of a couple of gunboats blocking the river would be that practically the whole of the import and export trade of Szechuan would be stopped. The bulk of the people are independent of the import and export trade, so would be unaffected; the exporters of bristles, pigs' intestines, wool and other bulky goods would lose their trade, while the smaller and more valuable exports (silk and medicines, also opium) would find their way out overland. Merchants in Chungking and other large centres selling imported foreign goods would not be able to renew their stocks, but the real losers would be the foreign (principally British) exporters.
Where the effect of the blockade would immediately make itself felt would be in the salt trade; it would involve the complete stoppage of one of Szechuan's principal exports, and the one from which the military authorities derive their revenue. It would even be possible to stop salt junks only, so as not to interfere with the general trade of the province. It may, therefore, be said that the effects of the blockade would be felt most by the Szechuanese military authorities, so that it would have more to recommend it and be less objectionable than many blockades. None the less, there are many and serious objections :-
1. The blockade would have to be continued for several months before it would have any effect. A stoppage of exports of salt for three or four months often takes place, but it does not affect the revenue; production goes on and stocks are accumulated pending restoration of trade.
2. Hupeh* is dependent on Szechuan for its salt supplies; the stoppage of export from Szechuan involves also the stoppage of import into Hupeh. A blockade of Szechuan is, therefore, also, in some measure, a blockade of Hupeh. If we wish to ensure unity between the Kuomintang in Hupeh and the unbalanced politicians of Szechuan, I can imagine no better way to ensure it.
3. The machinery to be employed seems quite disproportionate to the ends to be attained-we should be using a steam hammer to crack a nut, with no certainty of even cracking the nut. We should, as a first step towards preventing extinction of our interests, have to withdraw them entirely, and then, by means of a blockade, create a favourable soil for their re-establishment. I find it impossible to imagine how this side of the project would work.
November 17, 1926.
W. STARK TOLLER.
* I.e., the province in which are Hankow and Wuchang, the prospective capital of the Nationalist Government.
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