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(b.) That if by 8 P.M. the same evening no reply had been received from Tokyo, the whole of the above dispositions should be carried out with the exception of the issue of final notices to Class A Reservists, which should be suspended until a further decision was taken.
(c.) That if the telegram from Tokyo should show that the Japanese are prepared to co-operate, or should be indefinite, authority should be given to the Foreign Secretary and such Ministers as might be within reach of London during the next few days to take a decision on behalf of the Cabinet as to what modifications (if any) should be made in the previous military dispositions.
(d.) To take note of the instructions sent to Canton on the recommendation of the Committee of Chiefs of Staff (No. 49 to Peking, repeated to Canton).*
(e.) To take note that the Secretary of State for War was sending a Gas Unit to China for defensive purposes; that he was purchasing gas to send with the unit; but that gas was not to be employed without express authority from home.
,,
18. Shortly after the Meeting the following telegram was received from Tokyo indicating that the contingency provided for in Conclusion (a) had arisen. Immediate steps were taken accordingly :-
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Japanese Government are not able to give the required assistance.
They maintain the proposed international force of 4.000 can keep order and prevent any excuse for irruption by Cantonese troops into settlement. Cantonese would be afraid to make deliberate attack on international concession. Decision to send Japanese expeditionary force would require preliminary measures which must become known. Knowledge would inflame Chinese and make matters worse. At present Japanese are not being molested. Cantonese are well aware that if really provoked Japan could send any number of troops at short notice with or without British co-operation. He did not quite exclude, however, possibility of Japanese evacuating Shanghai.
I made clear that on receipt of this telegram you would have at once to decide your policy [group undecypherable] Japan, namely, whether you must evacuate [group undecypherable] or send a large force on your own account, but that your disappointment would be great, not only on this account but at missing an opportunity of co-operating with Japan where we have such close allied interests.
This argument lasted nearly two hours."
2, Whitehall Gardens, S. W. 1, January 21, 1927.
* Not printed.
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