41
(d.) That the Secretary of State for the Colonies should notify the Governor of Hong Kong that the instructions to Canton would be repeated, and to communicate their contents to the naval and military authorities."
14. At this meeting also the recommendation of the Chiefs of Staff in regard to the employment of tear gas referred to in paragraph 8 above was considered
and it was agreed-
That the Secretary of State for War should have authority to purchase gas and to send it with the gas unit to China. but that no decision should be taken at present as to its actual employment.
15.
At this meeting the "Chief of the Imperial General Staff handed round a note he had received of a conversation with the Japanese Military Attaché, the purport of which was that the Japanese General Staff's original proposal had been meant to refer only to reinforcements such as could be provided by the Navy for maintaining order at Shanghai; that in their view the British Chiefs of Staff had exaggerated the imminence of danger to Shanghai; that conversation in regard to military reinforcements on any serious scale would be premature; and that for the moment it was sufficient to exchange information.”
The effect of this information on the dispositions approved by the Cabinet for reinforcing Shanghai-see paragraph 9 above was considered, and it was agreed-
CC
(a.) That the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should definitely clear up the situation with the Japanese Government by sending the telegram attached in Appendix I, explaining the considerations of time and space which (more especially in the absence of knowledge as to the intentions of the Japanese Government) compel the British Government to take decisions before matters appear urgent to the Japanese Government; and pressing for a reply within 48 hours regarding Japanese intentions.
(b.) That no action should be taken to delay the provision of the necessary shipping transport for the scheme of reinforcements approved by the Cabinet, but that the issue of final orders to units and of notices to Class A Reservists should be withheld for a further 48 hours.
(c.) That the Secretary of State for War (in the absence of the Secretary of State and Parliamentary Under-Secretary for India) should arrange with the India Office to invite the Government of India to order the units of their mixed Brigade to prepare to sail as soon as possible on receipt of further orders, and to notify that a further telegram would be sent later in the week.
(d.) That in regard to publicity, the Secretary of State for War should instruct the official concerned to do his best to damp down publication in the Press of military movements; to point out to the Press that such military dispositions as have been taken have as their sole object the protection of British lives in China; to remind them that all military information published will reach Eugene Chen and may prejudice the negotiations now in progress with a view to a settlement."
16. The Cabinet again met on Friday, the 21st January, at 3 P.M., and had before them the Report by the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee on the Defence of Shameen (C.I.D. Paper No. 762-B) referred to in paragraph 11 above, together with a note by the Secretary explaining that, in view of the urgency of the question, instructions to the Acting Consul-General and to the Naval, Military and Civil Authorities at Hong Kong had been telegraphed on the authority of the Prime Minister and the Ministers concerned. At this meeting it was explained that no definite information had so far been received as to the measure of co-operation which the Japanese Government was willing to undertake in the defence of common interests at Shanghai.
17. After full consideration the Cabinet agreed-
"(a.) That if the telegram from Tokyo should show unmistakably that the Japanese have no serious intention of co-operating with military forces in the defence of Shanghai, the whole of the dispositions decided on by the Cabinet on the 17th January (Cabinet 2 (27), Conclusion 2),* should be carried out.
* See paragraph 9.