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(f) That in view of the great importance of prompt action represented in the Report of the Chiefs of Staff on the defence of Shanghai (C.P. 12 (27)),' it was unsafe to base our arrangements on the assumption that the Japanese would provide part of the Division for the defence of Shanghai, and that in consequence the force to be prepared must not be limited, as hitherto proposed, to one mixed brigade and a squadron of aeroplanes. The preparations to be made should provide at first for a force of one brigade from India, one brigade from the Mediterranean, and one brigade from home. The force could he reduced if Japanese co-operation was assured.
(9.) That the India Office should ask the Government of India to make all arrangements, including taking up shipping, for the despatch of a mixed brigade from India, which the Cabinet were informed might be available for action at Shanghai in 30-32 days' time.
(h.) That the President of the Board of Trade, in consultation with the Secretary of State for War, should immediately make arrangements to get ready shipping to take the first British brigade to Shanghai (which the Cabinet were informed would arrive at Shanghai within 40-48 days' time); and for a second British brigade (53–61 days).
(1) That the Secretary of State for War should make preliminary arrange- ments for the despatch of the two British brigades referred to above as soon as shipping is ready, but, as the Japanese Government might be deterred from co-operation if we were suddenly to announce the despatch of so large a force, he was asked to postpone the issue of final orders for 48 hours. He was also asked to postpone the issue of final notices to Class A reservists for a few days.
(7.) That the First Lord of the Admiralty should make arrangements for the despatch at the earliest possible date (Fridav. the 21st January) of 1.000 marines to Shanghai (due in 36-37 days), as well as for the sailing of the first British cruiser squadron from the Mediterranean (1,000 rifles) which should arrive in 24 days.
(k) That the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should instruct Mr. O'Malley to send all the information he could gather as to any movement of the Cantonese forces towards Shanghai.
Canton-Defence of Shameen.
(.) That the above decisions in regard to our general policy and the defence of Shanghai involved a change in the political assumptions on which the Chiefs of Staff Committee had been ordered to make their recent report on the defence of Shameen, and that the Committee of Chiefs of Staff should reassemble on the following day to re-examine the question of the defence of Shameen on the assumption that Shanghai was to be held and that His Majesty's Govern- ment were no longer committed to the policy of avoiding hostilities with the military forces at Canton in all circumstances. The Chiefs of Staff were asked to make recommendations for revised instructions to the British Consul-General at Canton, and the Naval and Military authorities at Hong Kong.
Miscellaneous.
(m.) That the Parliamentary Under-Secretary for the Colonies should arrange for officials of the Dominions Department to place themselves in communication with the Permanent Under-Secretary of State, Foreign Office, with a view to supplying to the Dominion Governments full information of the policy of His Majesty's Government and of the reasons for it, alike as regards their endeavour to secure a peaceful settlement on liberal terms and their decision not to be hustled or driven out of Shanghai.
(n.) That the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should make arrange- ments, through the Press, to prepare public opinion for the measures indicated in these Conclusions. While making clear that there could be no surrender to violence, and that the military dispositions had the object of carrying out the Government's pledge to defend the lives of British subjects in China, emphasis should be laid on the fact that the Government's policy was primarily one of conciliation and a settlement by agreement."
It will be noted that the employment of gas, referred to in paragraph 8 above, was not considered at this meeting.
* Also C.J.D. Paper No. 761-B.
CK
10. On the morning of the 18th January, the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee met in accordance with the instruction of the Cabinet (see Conclusion (1) in previous paragraph) to re-examine the question of the defence of Shameen on the assumption that Shanghai was to be held, and that His Majesty's Government were no longer committed to the policy of avoiding hostilities with the military forces at Canton in all circumstances." This meeting was attended by Sir Gilbert Grindle on behalf of the Colonial Office, and Mr. Mounsey on behalf of the Foreign Office, while Rear Admiral A. J. B. Stirling, C.B. (late Commodore at Hong Kong), was also present to advise as to local conditions.
11. As a result of this meeting a further report was drafted, which has been circulated as C.I.D. Paper No. 762–B.
The recommendations of the Sub-Committee are summarised in this report as follows:-
if
(1.) That the British Consul-General at Canton, the Governor and the naval and military authorities at Hong Kong should receive instructions to the following effect :--
(a.) That the men on the spot should have full discretion to hold the Shameen as long as they consider possible, whether against mob violence or against Cantonese troops, with such forces as can be placed at their disposal from Hong Kong, having regard to conclusion (c) below.
(b.) That arrangements should be made for the evacuation from Shameen of all non-combatants before serious trouble eventuates, the exact time for such evacuation being left to the man on the spot.
(c.) That no further reinforcements can be despatched to Hong Kong for the defence of Shameen, and that one battalion must be held in readiness at Hong Kong to proceed to Shanghai in accordance with present instructions.
(d.) That the use of aircraft, in connection with the defence of Shameen, is permitted, and that, should the situation necessitate it, the shelling of vital points in Canton or of the river defences is permitted.
(2.) That if considerations other than military allow, the Acting Consul- General, Canton, should be authorised, as proposed in his telegram No. 5* of the 13th January, to inform the General-in-Command of the Chinese Forces, Canton, that if Shameen is attacked, we shall take such steps as we may think fit, but that the actual nature of such steps should not be specified. Also that discretion should be given to him to arrange for a demonstration over Canton by as many aircraft as can be made available at the moment that this communication is being conveyed to the Chinese General.
(3.) That if Shameen is attacked, a blockade of Canton and the bombing and shelling of vital points (such as magazines, military establishments, &c.) are among the counter-measures which should be permitted.
(4.) That immediate authority should be given to the Governor and Naval authorities at Hong Kong for the use of the Kowloon Aerodrome."
12. This report was considered at a special meeting at 10, Downing Street,
at 5 P.M. on the 19th January under the presidency of the Prime Minister. The minutes of this Meeting are attached as an annexure to this Memorandum.
13. In regard to the report of the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee (C.I.D. Paper
No. 762-B) on the defence of Shameen it was agreed:
LC
(a) To approve the Report of the Committee of Chiefs of Staff (C.I.D Paper No. 762–B).
(b.) That the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should telegraph instructions, based on the conclusions of the Report, to the Acting Consul- General, Canton, which should be repeated to the Governor of Hong Kong.
(c.) That the Secretary of State for War should authorise the Chief of the Imperial General Staff to send a supplementary telegram to the General Officer Commanding at Hong Kong, based on the reference in the last part of paragraph of the Report to the fact that we cannot expect to hold out indefinitely against serious attack by the Cantonese troops.
* Printed as Appendix II to C.I.D. Paper No. 759–B.
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