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down to ports in the North and South, which would also have to be blockaded. This would probably unite the North and South against us. The injury caused to our own nationals and to the Chinese, who are at present most friendly towards us, would also have to be taken into account.
(iii.) A "Pacific Blockade.--Measures of this nature would have little good
result.
The broad general conclusions outlined above are elaborated in a Report which is now in course of preparation.
5. On the 14th January, 1927, a meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee was again convened in accordance with the instructions of the Prime Minister at the request of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to consider a telegram from the General Officer Commanding at Hong Kong to the War Office (No. 1279,* dated the 13th January, 1927), in which the question of the evacuation of Shameen was raised. This meeting was attended by Sir Victor Wellesley on behalf of the Foreign Office and by Sir Gilbert Grindle and Mr. Clutterbuck on behalf of the Colonial Office.
6. After examining the situation in the light of the most recent information available, the Chiefs of Staff drew up a report which was circulated as C.ID. Paper No. 759-B. The conclusions reached by the Chiefs of Staff at this meeting are contained in the following extract from this report :--
(10.) We recommend that the instructions to the local Naval, Military and Civil authorities should be guided by the following principles :---
(a.) The policy of His Majesty's Government is to avoid becoming engaged in active hostilities with the Chinese military forces, since this might unite the whole of China in a war against us. They must. therefore, avoid action calculated to precipitate this contingency, (b) Subject to this paramount consideration, the Concessions are to be protected against mob violence to the utmost extent possible with the forces available locally, but, if the continued occupation of the Concessions is impossible without action calculated to involve hostilities with the Chinese forces, the men on the spot must have full discretion to evacuate.
(11.) We recognise that these instructions place a heavy responsibility on those who have to take a decision, whether to hold on or to evacuate. Their position in this respect is similar to that of an officer commanding a rearguard, where the enemy's advance guard consists of the mob and the main body is the Cantonese army. They must, therefore, be given wide discretion.
(12.) Subject to the above, and to the consent of the Governor, we recommend that the General Officer Commanding at Hong Kong, in consultation with the local Naval authorities and the acting Consul-General at Canton, should be authorised, if the situation becomes serious, to send to Shameen such troops as he thinks necessary and as he can spare, having due regard to the security of Hong Kong and to the call which may at any moment arise from Shanghai for the despatch of the Indian Battalion.
(13.) We cannot recommend, however, that authority should be given to block the entrance to the river, as proposed, much less the bombing of Canton, at present.'
7. On the 17th January, with the authority of the Prime Minister, the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee again met as a matter of urgency at 12:30 P.M. to consider the military aspects of the defence of Shanghai. After this meeting a further report was drafted (C.I.D. Paper No. 761-B), the conclusions of which are summarised in the following extract —
(7.) Our Conclusions and Recommendations in regard to the defence of Shanghai in the present circumstances may be summarised as follows:--
(a.) If Shanghai is to be secured, it is of the first importance that the troops for this purpose should be despatched at once, otherwise they may arrive on the scene too late. Any delay in this connection is dangerous.
Printed as Appendix I to C.1.D. Paper No. 759-B.
(b.) The following British troops should be despatched to Shanghai at
once :-
(i) One mixed Brigade from India.
(ii) 1,000 Marines.
(iii) The First Cruiser Squadron (which can supply a landing-
party of 1,000 rifles).
(c.) That recommendation (b) is on the understanding that the remainder of the units required to complete the Division which is necessary for the defence of Shanghai will be provided by other nationalities. If other nationalities are not prepared to provide the remainder of the Division we shall have to provide a complete Division ourselves. (8.) We understand that arrangements are being made for the supply of such necessities as barbed wire, ammunition, &c.
date.
(9.) Provided that authority is given to-day to carry out the moves recommended in paragraph 7 above, it is estimated that the troops concerned will be available for action at Shanghai in 30 to 32 days from this Our latest information is to the effect that the earliest date on which the Chinese Nationalist Forces can arrive at Shanghai is 30 days from to-day. It will be seen, therefore, that in order to ensure effective inter- vention on our part the necessary orders for the move of our troops must be given to-day.
8.
4.
*---
In addition to the defence of Shanghai, the Chiefs of Staff at this meeting also considered a proposal to use * Tear Gas against mobs, and recommended
After taking into consideration the many factors affecting its use, we unanimously recommend that authority should be given for gas to be used in China against the mob, subject to the issue of very definite instructions as to the circumstances under which it may be employed."
9. The reports (C.I.D. Papers Nos. 759-B and 761-B) of the Chiefs of Staff referred to in paragraphs 6 and 7 above were considered by the Cabinet at a meeting held on Monday, the 17th January, 1927, at 3 P.M. (Cabinet 2 (27), Conclusion 2), when, after a careful examination, the Cabinet agreed-
General Policy.
(a.) That regard for the protection of British lives no less than the disastrous effect which the surrender of Shanghai to violence would have on the British position in China, Japan, India and throughout the East, precluded the possibility of basing any policy either on the evacuation (even if that were possible), or on the surrender of Shanghai.
(b.) That Mr. O'Malley should be instructed to inform Mr. Eugene Chen, the Cantonese Foreign Minister, that we were prepared to go a very long way towards meeting their desires in regard to treaty revision, provided that they in turn were prepared to negotiate a settlement. But if they refused to negotiate, and insisted on recovering the concessions by force, whether by mob violence or by troops, Eugene Chen should be told that we should take such steps as we thought fit. In that event we should hold Shanghai, preferably in concert with other Powers, but in the last resort with British forces only.
(e) That the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should give approval to the general proposals in Sir Miles Lampson's telegram No. 8* of the 3rd January, which should form the basis of Mr. O'Malley's conversations with Mr. Eugene Chen in regard to the concessions to be made to the Chinese in connection with the revision of treaties.
(d.) That the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should telegraph to the Governments of France, Italy, United States of America, and Japan, in general terms, our proposals in regard to treaty revision and our intentions in regard to the defence of Shanghai. That Sir Miles Lampson should be authorised to make a similar communication to the Ministers of the Powers at Peking.
(e) That the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should telegraph to the Japanese Government the details of reinforcements it was proposed to send to Shanghai, as set forth below, and to ask what forces they were prepared to send.
* Not printed.
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