- 9
But,
of the critical situation of the Canton army on the
Yangisze and the hazardous political conditions in Kuang-tung, this threat alone might suffice.
if it did not, we recommended that the ports of
Canton and Swatow should be closed by naval action.
We considered that under conditions then existing
such a step would not cause any unfavourable re-
action in other parts of China, and we believed
that all local representatives of Foreign Powers
would be thankful to see this step taken. I
telegraphed to you in this sense on the 13th Sept-
ember after consulting Major-General Luard, Rear-
Admiral Stirling and Messrs. Southorn, Kemp, Halli-
fax and Bernard, who all concurred.
8.
The matter was further considered by me
in Executive Council on the 16th September, where
again there was unanimity of opinion. We believed
that there was then a unique opportunity of ending
the boycott rapidly by independent British warlike
action with a minimum of risk of unfavourable effect
upon the situation elsewhere in China or upon Foreign
Powers. The naval action taken by us on the 4th
September had been cordially welcomed by Chinese in
Hong Kong and even in Canton, the only comment being that it was long overdue. The plan prepared by
Rear-Admiral Stirling for further naval action and
described in his telegram to the Admiralty dated
the 15th September, reduced the risk from warlike
action to a minimum and might, we thought, succeed without firing a shot. Such a step, if taken by
us
119