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comments, which I heartily endorse. He points out that there is still no recognized Government of China and still no
national tariff and that it is, therefore, premature to
acquiesce in the Nanking scheme: that Japan is most unlikely
to agree to such a surrender, for even the Washington
surtaxes have not yet received her imprimatur: that, if we yield, there is no limit to the exactions which may be placed
on trade by every regional authority throughout China: that what can be arbitrarily done regarding tariff can be equally
done with the other remaining treaty-rights, and probably
will be done even more quickly than we anticipate: that
British firms trading in China are on the verge of collapse
and that it is our duty to protect their interests, seeing
that we are in China only for trade: that we should be ill-
advised to take at its face value the offer of prospective
abolition of internal taxation, even if genuinely meant,
which is problematic, or practically possible (which, as regards likin, it is not), for, if the Chinese can break their treaty pledge, they can just as easily break their promises: and that it would be unfair to our traders to say
that we will support them, knowing in our hearts that we do not in the last resort mean to do so. Finally, Sir Miles
points out that a vital question of principle is at stake. It is not only tariff, but the whole fabric of the treaties that is in jeopardy (Peking telegram to Foreign Office No.
1213 of 31st July).
14.
I may add to this trenchant criticism that
there is no guarantee whatever, as the British Foreign Office
seems to think, that the seizure of tariff autonomy by the
Nanking Government would be accompanied by maintenance of the
integrity