3.
4.
5.
place as a Naval Base if the enemy were in possession
of the mainland, would serve to prevent the enemy using
the Harbour himself.
(c) Under normal conditions there would be, at
present, no air forces acting in the defence.
In these circumstances, it appears to us that
unless and until additional Naval, Military and Air Forces
can be allotted to the Defence, the plan for this should'
be based on the retention of the Island at all costs,
operations on the mainland being limited to such
delaying action as could be profitably carried out without seriously weakening the forces available for attaining this object.
To enable the harbour to be protected so that we could use it ourselves the following forces would
be necessary-
(a) Naval forces sufficient to make the enemy
attempt no serious landing nearer than the Western
shores of Bias Bay.
(b) Military forces amounting in all to about
4 Battalions Infantry
1200 Artillery, and other troops
double
in proportion, i.e. nearly the
present garrison.
(c) Air Forces as explained in Appendix'B' to this
memorandum.
It should,however, be clearly understood that
unless the Naval forces mentioned in (a) can be provided, no reasonable Military or Air Force can be
of any use.
Appendices 'A' and 'B', with which we agree, examine the situation from the Military and Air Force
points of view, in some detail.
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6.
4.18
If the views expressed in this memorandum are accepted, there appear to be only two alternatives, viz. either to increase the defence forces, or to acknowledge the fact that in the event of an overseas attack, the place would not for long be usable as a Base for the British fleet.
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C
SECRET. Appendix 'A
DEFENCE OF HONGKONG AGAINST AN
ATTACK BY AN OVERSEAS ENEMY.
APPRECIATION of the situation as it actually exists in 1926 from a Military point of view.
1.
The Object of the Defence.
The first object of the defence of Hongkong is to hold it intact for use as a British Naval Base, when required.
The second object of the defence, to be aimed at if the first cannot be attained, is to prevent the enemy using the place as a Naval Base himself.
The third object of the defence is to ensure that those resources of Hongkong, which would make it valuable to the enemy as a Naval Base, shall, as far as possible, be destroyed before it is captured.
2.
(a)
(i)
(ii)
time to about
(b)
(iii)
(iv)
(i)
Factors affecting the attainment of these Objects.
Strength of the Defence Forces.
The Naval Forces allotted to the Defence of the place are as follows:-
1 Flotilla Submarines.
4 Sloops.
5 River Gun Boats.
The military forces amount in peace 3,000 regular troops, (vide app. 'A'); and 600 Volunteers. It is estimated that in emergency, they could be expanded as shown in Appendix 'A.l'.
There are no Air Forces.
There are no mines, and it has been ruled that the Washington Treaty does not allow mines to be kept at Hongkong. While it might be possible for some to be kept at Singapore, for use at Hongkong when emergency arose, there are none there at present. If there were, then it might not be possible for them to arrive, and be laid in time to be of any use. Moreover, even if they were laid they would require protection which could only be provided by Naval forces which are not available.
Strength of the attacking forces.
The Naval Forces available for the attack would probably be enough to gain and, until the arrival of the British Fleet, to hold almost complete local
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