believe that they might under actually existing conditions deny to the enemy the use of Hongkong harbour until the arrival of reinforcements, such reinforcements, when they arrived would probably find the existing maval, military and commercial facilities of this Colony so crippled, if not actually ruined, as to make Hongkong of little further strategic value for a considerable period.
5.
It is impossible for the Government of Hongkong to contemplate with equanimity the position revealed in this appreciation of the situation by the Naval and Military Authorities, and in the event of H.M's Government concurring in the opinions expressed in the joint memorandum enclosed in this despatch, I would urge very strongly that steps should be taken as soon as possible:-
(a) to strengthen the local naval forces in such a manner as would prevent an enemy from attempting a serious landing nearer than the Western shores of Bias Bay:
(b) to strengthen the military garrison of Hongkong in such a manner as would prevent a hostile force from capturing the New Territories of Hongkong before
the arrival of reinforcements: and
(c) to provide the air force recommended for the
protection of the Colony in Captain C.P.Talbot's memorandum attached to this despatch.
6.
I have shown this despatch in draft to Admiral Sir Edwyn Alexander-Sinclair and to General
C.C.Luard, who inform me that they are forwarding to the Admiralty and the War Office respectively, with
appropriate