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extent we benefited by its denunciation. The two factors which have produced a considerable change in popular feeling towards us in the United States are said to be the lapse of our alliance with Japan and our treaty with Ireland.
2. Conditions have altered considerably in Japan, where the rise of indus- trialism has produced a more democratic and anti-militarist spirit, which has induced successive Japanese Governments to display a more friendly attitude towards Bolshevist Russia than they ever did towards Czarism. This new spirit would, I fear, considerably hamper any Japanese Government if it were to renew an alliance with us for the purpose of combating Bolshevism. This new spirit has also, I believe, considerably modified Japanese policy vis-à-vis of China. It no longer aims at the absorption of Manchuria by military means, but rather contemplates the economic penetration of China.
3. This new orientation in Japanese policy may lead to a divergence of views between us and the Japanese in our respective attitudes towards China, and thus create a further obstacle to a renewal of the old alliance.
I should therefore consider the prospects of securing Japanese assistance by means of an alliance as so problematical as to be hardly worth the attempt, but we should maintain our present policy of cultivating the friendliest relations with Japan as far as may be compatible with the promotion of British interests.
I therefore fully share the Chancellor of the Exchequer's dislike of an alarmist policy with regard to Japan, and fully endorse Lord Salisbury's recommendation in favour of common action with her against Russian aggression and his regret at the adoption of any policy which did not allow us to look upon her as a friend. I have no hesitation in stating that our policy should be based upon the assumption that Russia is the enemy and not Japan. The most we have to dread from the latter is commercial rivalry.
It seems to me that the revival of the nationalist spirit in China is the best guarantee we have against Russia, and we should therefore continue to display our sympathy with China by persuading her of the sincerity of our aspirations as shown in our tariff negotiations.
The next field for Russian Bolshevik attack is to be found in Europe, and when the Foreign Office is asked for recommendations to combat it in Europe, the answer is that we look upon the policy embodied in the Locarno treaties as laying the foundations for a settlement of continental conditions which offers the best prospects for our most effective protection against the common danger from the East.
What is the aim and object of the Locarno policy? It is, as far as I under- stand it, to reconcile Germany and France, and, above all, Poland and Germany. I say
"above all the latter, because until the relations between them are re-established, the wound in Europe cannot heal, and we shall fail to get peace and settlement on the Continent, which are so vital for the resumption of our trade.
From the moment we declared at Locarno that as regards the frontier of the Rhine we came as contributors, a settlement of that vexed question took place almost automatically, since the British guarantee was bound to make an irresist- ible appeal to both Germany and France. But the greatest achievement at Locarno was the treaty signed between Germany and Poland, for which no British guarantee was available.
Thereby we started a gradual reconciliation of France, Germany and Poland, with the approval and support of Italy and Central Europe, and thereby we hope to tempt both Germany and Poland to look to the West and resist whatever. tempting offers Russia may make in order to break up the European family.
In view of the Russian danger, it was therefore unfortunate that the dispute in connection with seats in the Council of the League of Nations gave a temporary set-back to the development of the Locarno policy. One of its results was the conclusion of the recent Russo-German treaty, which Germany concluded but reluctantly, largely under the pressure of the Junker party.
If I may venture upon an estimate of the distribution of parties in Germany, I should say that there is a strong and active minority which realises the folly of the war and is determined not to repeat such folly. On the other hand, there is a violent minority that has learned nothing, and is quite ready to repeat the crime of 1914, provided it possesses the means to do so. The latter cherishes the mirage of a friendly Russia that would promote its aims. Between these two parties
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there is a floating mass which it is our interest to win over the side of the sane minority that is struggling to reconstruct a new Germany.
Likewise in Poland there is a conviction growing that she cannot face two enemies; that she must choose between East and West; and that her best choice is to look to the West by the promotion of sound relations with her German neighbour. Here again it should be our policy to encourage and promote in every way the present régime at Warsaw, which professes such aims.
I hope I may have succeeded in this very brief and imperfect account I have given of our European policy as expressed and embodied in the Locarno Treaty-in proving that if we can persuade France, Germany, Italy and Poland to continue to co-operate in giving effect to our Locarno policy, we shall have provided ourselves with the best and most effective protection against the common Russian danger.
There are two factors in the present continental situation which are working in favour of our policy :-
1. The very serious economic situation which demands peremptorily the adoption of a sane foreign policy aiming at the stabilisation of European conditions; and
2. The very happy personal relations which at present exist between this country and the leading men abroad, such as M. Briand, M. Mussolini, Herr Stresemann and Count Skrzynski.
I venture to say that the importance of these personal relations in the shaping of foreign policy cannot be exaggerated and offer the most solid guarantee for the success of our policy.
I have purposely omitted any reference to warlike measures against Russia because they are mainly the concern of the Chiefs of the General Staffs, but the view of this Office on the subject is that war is not practical politics owing to the absence of means to go to war and a strong determination in the country against warlike operations. I may add that there is also a continental opinion strongly opposed to a campaign against Russia.
It is therefore to diplomacy that we have to look for the most practical and effective weapon to oppose Bolshevism, and in this choice we can reasonably rely upon the cordial co-operation of the most important continental Governments as at present constituted in Europe, provided we persevere steadily and impartially in the pursuit of the policy, the foundations of which were laid at Locarno, based as it is upon mutual self-interest and sanity-two very powerful factors in the regulation of human relations.
Foreign Office, July 26, 1926.
W. T.
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