432
pursuit of that policy than their predecessors ever were.
The obrious counter measure would be the
resurrection of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, The
difficulties, however, of effecting such a
resurrection are great and may be briefly
summarised as follows:-
(1) It is easier to denounce than to
renew an alliance.
(2) Conditions have altered considerably in
Japan, where the rise of industrialism pas poroduced
O more democratio tanti-militarios spint and which
has induced successive Japanese Governments
to display a more friendly attitude towards
Bolshevist Russie than they ever did towards
Czari gm. This new spirit would, it iar feared,
considerably hamper any Japanese Government
if it were to renew an alliance with us for
the purpose of combating Bolshevism. This
new spirit has also, it is believed, considerably
modified Japanese policy vis-à-vis of China.
It no longer aims at the absorption of Manchuria
by military means, but rather contemplates the
economic
i(
economic penetration of China.
(3) This new orientation in Japanese
policy may lead to a divergence of
views between us and the Japanese
in our respective attitudes towards
China, and thus create a further
obstacle to a renewal of the old alliance.
3.
It is considered, therefore, that
•
the prospects of securing Japanese assistance
av
by means of an alliance a so problematical
as to be hardly worth the attempt, the same
time we should maintain our present policy
of cultivating the friendliet relations with
Japan as far as may be compatible with the
promotion of British interests, and we should
endeavour to avoid the adoption of any policy
which did not allow us to look upon her as
a friend. If possible, common action with her
against Russian aggression should be encouraged,
and British policy should be based upon the
assumption that Russia is the enemy and not
dread
Japan. The most that we have to/from the
latter