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lowered in the eyes of the Chinese by a successful boycott, and also on the assumption that the garrison would enjoy the support of naval vessels. He considers also that a larger force would only tend to increase the number of casualties, should the Cantonese employ artillery or aircraft against Shameen (see paragraph 3 (d) below).
3. It is submitted that this estimate is quite inadequate, for the following reasons:--
(a) It is known that the efficiency of the Cantonese army has increased during the
last year under the control and training of Russian advisers.
(b) Shameen is an island 1,000 yards long; and, although there are only two bridges connecting it with Canton, yet the waterway which divides it from that city is only 100 feet wide; an attack could thus easily be made on any selected part of the 1,000 yards front.
(c) In view of (b) above, the Cantonese mob should be able to overwhelm such a
small garrison, if the attempt were really determined.
(d) It must moreover be remembered that it is not only the mob which has to be taken into account; it would be necessary also to prepare for attack by the organized Cantonese military forces which might be supported by artillery and aircraft. Although at the moment these forces are mostly far away from Canton, yet they could, in time, be brought back in sufficient numbers to deliver an effective attack, supported by artillery and aircraft, against which it might be difficult for an isolated infantry garrison at Shameen to put up an effective resistance,
(e) The garrison at Shameen could not rely on continued support by H.M. ships. Unless the defences of Bocca Tigris and Danes Island had been first reduced, these ships would have to sail up channels which could very easily be blocked by sunken junks; considering the fact that the Cantonese army has a Russian backing, it is very probable that these channels would be so blocked, The garrison would, in such a case, have to face the probability of being marooned and left to its own resources.
(f) There remains the moral factor to be considered. Would the Cantonese actually dare to attack the British ? Local opinion in China considers that they would not do so, and that, for this reason, a small force locked up in Shameen would be safe. In other words, the Cantonese would not call our bluff. It must, however, he realised that, if they did choose to call our bluff, the consequences might be very serious and far-reaching unless we had made adequate preparations beforehand. The recent incident at Wanhsien showe that the Chinese troops there overcame their reluctance to come to grips with us, and further that they found out that British personnel were not invulnerable. This episode, coupled with the increased efficiency of the Cantonese army referred to in (a) above, indicates that it would be most unwise for us to rely entirely on the moral superiority which we have, up till now, possessed.
4. In view of these considerations it is probable that two companies and a section of machine guns is the smallest garrison which could safely be placed in Shameen in the event of it being decided to institute a blockade, and it would be desirable that they should be supported by at least two sections of pack artillery.
5. But the provision of the force mentioned in the previous paragraph would not necessarily complete our military commitments. Even allowing that such a force could maintain itself against any attack which the Cantonese would be likely to deliver, it does not appear that it would be a very difficult task for the Chinese to isolate this garrison in the manner described in paragraph 3 (e) above. If the garrison of Shameen were marooned and the channel which avoids the river forts were effectively blocked, it would become imperative to restore communications with Shameen by forcing
a way up the main channel to Canton. This would involve the capture and destruction of the river forts at Bocca Tigris and Dane Island. These would, no doubt, be adequately manned as soon as the blockade was instituted, and their capture would necessitate a combined operation in which the Navy, Army and Air Force would all be concerned. It has been difficult to obtain recent information as to the state of these defences, and it is therefore not easy to estimate accurately the military force required to deal with them. But in view of the fact that all chance of failure must be eliminated, it is considered that the military force required for the purpose would be at least one infantry brigade, with artillery and engineers; a force which is stronger than could be found from the present garrison at Hong Kong. The provision of such a force from India would take some four
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or five weeks, and the delay involved before its arrival would give the Cantonese the opportunity of further strengthening the defences at the river forts as well as of attacking the Shameen garrison, There is moreover no certainty that once we were compelled to land on Chinese soil our commitments would not be still further extended. It would consequently only be prudent to have that force available before the blockade was instituted, and in this connection the possibility of French co-operation from Tonkin should be explored.
6. It must be remembered that operations undertaken against the river forts, not to mention the actual institution of a blockade, would in reality be acts of war against China, the resulting effects of which are impossible to gauge.
7. In view of the above considerations, and in spite of the unanimous opinion of the Political, Naval and Military representatives at Hong Kong, in which, it must be noted, the Naval Commander-in-Chief, China, does not concur, it appears that, from a military point of view, any blockade which the Government may decide to institute should be put in force only after the Europeans in the Shameen Concession have been evacuated, and in this the French are concerned as well as are we ourselves.
8. The following is a summary of the conclusions come to above :--
(a) Any action taken with regard to Shameen which involves military consequences will have to be taken in co-operation with, and with the prior agreement of, the French, who have a definite share in the foreign concession.
(6) The evacuation of Shameen will almost certainly involve its looting and possibly
its destruction by the Cantonese.
(c) The institution of a blockade without the evacuation of Shameen will almost certainly produce a demand for military protection. If this demand is to be met, a garrison of two companies of infantry, with machine guns, and two sections of pack artillery is considered the minimum that could safeguard itself and also the concession.
(d) Owing to navigational difficulties, a garrison in Shameen could quite easily be
cut off and marooned.
(e) If Shameen is cut off from the outside world, a combined naval, military and air operation would have to be undertaken to relieve it. It is not impossible that such an operation would land us in extensive commitments. The operation described in (e) would constitute an act of war against China. (9) Unless H.M. Government is prepared to face the above liabilities, the evacuation of Shameen should be a necessary preliminary to the institution of a blockade.