L
"(d) British interests inland can receive no
protection unless thay are on the navigable rivers, Missionaries and isolated individuals if threatened should be withdrawn to the ports.
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(e) Modern gunboats should be provided for use
on the rivers in China.
(f) An increase in our military forces in the Far East is desirable so that a small reserve may be available to meet emergencies such as the present.
(g) For the reasons given in the Joint Note
circulated with this report (see annexure) offensive action in China on a large scalo is not possible for the British Empire acting alone, and finality could not be hoped for from any operation within our capacity. Offensive action on a large goale can only be international, and even on that basis it would probably be unprofitable, except possibly for Japan, who must be the predominant partner."
The Committee of Imperial Defence then agreed to
recommend:-
"(a) That in the present circumstances no
reinforcement of the troops in Hong-Kong should take place.
(b) That, with a view to further consideration of the question in due course, the General Staff should enquire
P
(1) What expense would be incurred in making
the existing unused huts in Hong-Kong suitable for occupation by an Indian Battalion; and
(11) The extra expense involved if the
garrison of Hong-Kong were to be permanently increased by a British Battalion in addition to the Indian Battalion referred to in (a) above.
(c) That the Secretary of State for the Colonies
should consider whether the oost of permanent barracks might be met by the local Government or by some arrangement such as was proposed in the Report of the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee."
The answers to the questions asked in Oonclusion
(b) above are contained in C.I.D.Paper No. 263-0, and the answer to the question asked in donclusion (c) is contained
in C.I.D.Paper No. 257-0. Both these papers are awaiting consideration by the Committee of Imperial Defenc
(See in the latter case 0.0.File 51531/25).
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