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against Chang, Russian influence in the Peking-Shanghai
area would have been immensely strengthened and even
the Central Goverment at Peking might have been over-
whelmed. In any case there was imminent danger to the
commercial interests of all nationalities. This danger
has now passed; foreign trade is reviving, while the
Russians are left lamenting the useless expenditure of
money on financing and equipping the Kuominchun army
commanded by Feng Yu Hsiang.
The future in the North is very uncertain.
The Central Government at Peking is very unstable and
has long since ceased to govern, but there is no one
outstanding personality who is likely to take charge of
affairs and endeavour to weld together the discordant
elements. The latest development is a Russo-Chinese
dispute on the C.E.R. Should this not be settled soon
the whole situation in North China will be affected and
even Japan may have to intervene.
5. The Soviet schemes for the Bolshevisation
of China look both imposing and alarming on paper, but
when translated into action practical difficulties betray
their weaknesses. The Bolshevik machine, in fact, is
not yet capable of sustaining the load which it is
designed to carry take. I am informed that the
personnel of the Soviet Embassy is being constant ly changed and that considerable mutual distrust prevails among those whose duty it is to carry out Soviet policy. Comparatively few of the agents employed have the enthusiasm necessary for the work or are remunerated on a scale corresponding with the responsibility and difficulty of the task imposed. Practically every responsible person I meet is of opinion that China is
not
ade