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privileges of a civilised nation and refuse the responsibilities. Mr. Wu said the circumstances were unique. Hong Kong happened to be British, but the inhabitants were practically all Chinese and the strikers were not back in their own homes. agreed, and said that the Hong Kong Government, had no objection to their stopping their homes, and it had no intention of trying to force them to come back. What it did object to was the action of the Canton Government in allowing these men to use their territory as a base for an attack of Hong Kong's trade. There might be no exact parallel. but suppose the foreigners in Shameen had come to Hong Kong and had used it as a base to blockade the Pearl River and destroy Canton's trade, what would the attitude of the Canton Government be? It was, of course, inconceivable that the Hong Kong Government should allow such a thing. If there was to be any blockade it would shoulder the responsibility itself, and would not pretend that the Shameen people were legitimately entitled to war on Canton from Hong Kong. The discussion was continued at some length, and I got the definite impression that, with the exception perhaps of Mr. Wong Ching-wai, the council was quite sincere in its desire to settle, but that it was impossible for it to coerce the strikers beyond a certain point. I had suggested that the people in Canton and Hong Kong desired a settlement and that most of the strikers wished to get back to work. It was absurd in such circumstances that a comparatively small body of strike pickets should be able to stand in the way, however powerful they might be politically. It was suggested to me that the outside world failed to realise the immense power which labour was beginning to wield in China, and it must be remembered that the Kwok Man Tong, which was now practically the only political arty in China, was the people's party. The discussion ended with a statement by myself that, if the strikers insisted upon discussion of the political terms, the negotiations were at an end. I must warn Mr. Wong Ching-wai and his council that they must give their most serious consideration to the responsibility which they must incur for any consequences that might ensue. Mr. Wu here said that they had not the slightest wish for war. They had had much more than enough of it. 1 replied that I had not the slightest intention of even hinting at war. I regarded them as sensible men of the world, and I fully sympathised with their difficulties. My only wish was to advise them as a friend how the Hong Kong Government viewed the situation, and how, in my opinion, the outside world would view it. Mr. Wong Ching-wai said that they would consider very carefully whether some way could not be found out of the impasse, and we would resume the discussion in the evening. I then returned to Shameen, informed the consul-general of what had transpired and telegraphed to the Governor.
On thinking the matter over further, a suspicion deepened in my mind that the political terms difficulty was a bluff engineered by Mr. C. C. Wu, and, as we left for dinner, I suggested to the vice-consul that this was the case. We dined with
Mr. Foo Ping-sheung and Mr. Wong Cheung-kuk at the Foreign Office, the same party, with the exception of Mr. Wong Ching-wai, being present. Mr. C. C. Wu came at once to business. They had found a way round the impasse. The Govern- ment would be able to persuade the strikers to waive the political terms, but a formula would be necessary. I replied that in that event I would stay on and get this formula definitely settled. Mr. Wu said it would take some time and it would be better for the merchants to come and discuss the crucial questions of reinstatement and strike pay.
I said that I must know the terms of the formula first. The Hong Kong Government could not allow the merchants to enter upon protracted negotiations if at the end a formula was to be put forward to which the Hong Kong Government could not agree. Mr. Wu then gave me to understand that the matter depended upon the settlement with the merchants. If this was satisfactory, there would be no necessity for a formula, but the strikers would not abandon any part of their position until they were sure of their main point. We then proceeded to define the position. I pointed out that on Mr. Sung's original argument it was the Chinese merchants of both places who received benefit from the strikers' patriotic sacrifice, and the British merchants were therefore not concerned in the question of compensation. Mr. Wu replied that, in the first place, nothing was to be expected from the Canton merchants. They were even appointing delegates to sit with the strikers. Canton was very prosperous, shipping was increasing daily, and a large volume of trade was being successfully diverted from Hong Kong to Canton. The West River trade, for example, used to be entirely in Hong Kong hands, and Canton merchants had now got it. It was the same with regard to the shipping with Shanghai. A large number of the merchants were now opposed to a settlement. As
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regarded the British merchants, taking the longer view they were ultimately benefited by the strike, as it would hasten the independence and so the prosperity of China, with consequent increase of foreign trade. At any rate the British merchants were interested in the question of reinstatement. I replied that the question of reinstate- ment had been fully discussed. There was no rancour against the strikers personally, and I felt sure the large majority would take their men back if they had vacancies for them. The commodore, as I had already told them, was prepared to take back his skilled men in the naval yard in proportion as the work expanded and provided vacancies for them. It seemed to me that the reinstatement question resolved itself into one of payment, and that there was no ground for the British merchants to come up specially to discuss it. If the British merchants stood aloof and did not pay, would the strikers on that ground refuse to negotiate? The council agreed that they would not refuse, but that the negotiations would be considerably more difficult. A settlement was, however, quite possible if the Chinese merchants would meet the strikers in a liberal spirit. The council had put to the strikers my earlier query as to the amount of the strike-pay claimed, but they could give no answer. They were working out the figures. Mr. Sung had suggested to me on board HMS. Tarantula that the figure would run into several millions. In the course of the discussion Mr. Sung said that he wished to correct a wrong impression which he had given at the last meeting. It was not correct that the Government was not firmly in the saddle, and that it would fall if it coerced the strikers. It was in a position to impose its will absolutely, but if it was to coerce the strikers against popular sentiment it would lose, and rightly lose, the support of the people. I replied that if the Government had complete control, the least it could do was to see that all within its jurisdiction were compelled forthwith to conform to the civilised usages which were universal in the intercourse of friendly Powers.
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When the discussion was ended, I said that I wished to make a very serious and carefully-considered statement. The council had informed me that they were in complete control of the situation. What was the logical conclusion? Canton was maintaining a complete boycott of all British shipping and it was refusing all trade facilities to ships of other nations which touched at Hong Kong. This was contrary to all international law and custom, and such a state of affairs could only obtain The Canton Government must between civilised nations when they were at war.
very shortly decide whether they would accept the responsibility for this state of affairs, or whether they would repudiate it and put an end to it. If the strike negotiations failed, I felt sure that the British Government would call upon them to make this decision.
The council, in conclusion, promised its most cordial assistance in promoting every means of enabling the merchants and strikers to arrive at an amicable settlement. Mr. Sung reminded me of the Chinese proverb that a match-maker could bring the parties together, but could not guarantee that children would result. They would keep in close touch with the Hong Kong Government, and officials would exchange informal visits, if it should appear that this would help the situation in any way. I expressed my very great obligation to them for the friendly manner in which they had received me; the frank manner in which they had discussed the problem; and for their kind hospitality. I would inform the Governor. Mr. Sung asked me to express to the Governor his appreciation of the latter's hospitality.
As we were leaving I returned and asked if I might speak privately with Mr. C. C. Wu. I said that, as a new-comer to Shameen, I was impressed by the extraordinary state of affairs. It seems to be in the position of a beleaguered fortress, a position which was at least anomalous, appeared to be quite unnecessary. As our Governments had arrived at a friendly understanding, could not Mr. Wa meet the consul-general half-way and arrange for Shameen to be opened up for ordinary ingress and egress? I was not suggesting a lifting of the boycott. It would of course be a necessary condition that the Canton authorities should effectively control the strike pickets so as to prevent any possibility of an incident. Mr. Wa replied somewhat bitterly that the fault was entirely the consul-general's with his absurd wire and sandbags, for which there never had been any necessity, this had disappeared months ago. He would, however, meet the consul-general half-way in the establishing of friendly relations, and he would guarantee that the strikers' I informed the vice-consul of this pickets would be effectively controlled. conversation, and on my return I reported it and all that had transpired to the consul-general, who agreed that he would get into immediate touch with Mr. Wu.
During my long tour through the city and on the voyage up and down I took
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