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ENCLOSURE
The Commodore, Hong Kong.
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19th October, 1926.
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SUBJECT.
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SECRET.
500
No.429/H.K.053.
The Commander-in-Chief, China Station.
Situation in South China.
In continuation of my submission No.392/KH053 dated 18th September, 1926, I have the honor to submit the following report on the Southern situation since that date.
2.
The situation has been reported from time to time in my telegrams. For some considerable period the position was very obscure, and it was quite uncertain as to whether the undertaking to call off the boycott would be carried through or not. There were very strong pro-boycott and anti-British influences at work, and it was questionable whether the Canton Government were in a position to call off the boycott, or whether the other influences would be powerful enough to bring about the fall of the Government in the event of their taking the strongest line to achieve its aims. The result of such a happening could not be predicted.
3.
In any event it appeared necessary that arrangements of plans should be complete in order that if any coercive measures were approved they could be put into force promptly.
4.
In considering these proposed measures and the decisions of the Home Government (a) that evacuation of Shameen and Swatow would first be insisted upon and (b) that a blockade was out of the question, it was at once apparent that if (a) was to hold at Shameen, then no action at all could be recommended, as the loss of pres- tige, and the ruination of the Concession, which would inevitably follow its evacuation, would far outweigh any measures which could be proposed, short of war.
5.
Whilst it would appear most illogical to maintain a garrison in Shameen and inside the Canton defences and then to initiate coercive measures, it is submitted that the conditions existing in and around Canton and the embarrassment of the Canton Government at the time, combined with the knowledge that if necessary the garrison could be removed, accpeting reasonable risk justified the holding of the Shameen under the peculiar circumstances.
There was no reason at all why any attack should be made on the Shameen, and the garrison proposed was for use in the event of riots or mob attack in Canton, a not unlikely possibility with so many reactionaries opposed to the Government.
6.
It was known that most troops were with the Northern expedition and that those which remained would have their hands fully occupied with reactionaries if we acted as proposed and the Canton Government would not feel disposed to wage an unprovoked war against us. This
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