-
3.
136
For
150720
China": and in the next paragraph he writes:- "I imgine that the one steadfast aim of Japanese policy in the Far East is the control of Southern Manchuria and a preponderating influence in at least Northern
China.*
5.
Sir C. Eliot's exposition of the Japanese attitude towards the establishment of the Singapore base is contained in paragraphs 80
-
82 of his
despatch, from which it is quite clear that the project is viewed with suspicion and dislike in Japan.
6.
A narrative of the events which resulted
last year in the anti-British boycott in Kuang-tung
is given in paragraphs 44 52 of Sir C. Eliot's des- patch: and concerning the Shanghai incident of the 30th May, 1925, which led directly to the Shameen
Incident of the 23rd June, 1985, Sir C. Eliot writes:-
"Though these events resulted in bitter anti-British feeling and had most serious consequences for us, the primary cause of the trouble seems to have been anti- Japanese agitation". All British observers of the situation in south China, with whom I have had oppor- tunity for discussion, including Sir James Jamieson, Sir Sidney Barton and Mr. Brenan, have commented on the Japanese adroitness which shifted the consequences of anti-Japanese agitation in China so largely to British shoulders.
7.
A careful study of Sir C. Eliot's despatch leaves me with the impression that his appreciation
of the present position does not differ in any marked degree from my omm and that, as I suggested in the
21st paragraph of my secret despatch of the 27th June, "relations between ourselves and Japan would again be
2.8