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Paraphrase telegram from the Secretary of State for the Colonies
to the Governor of Hong Kong.
Sent 5.50 p.m. 16th August, 1926.
SECRET. We are considering with care your telegram of 9th August. But the following observations relate to the immediate questions in regard to Canton.
(a) The Canton Government is already recognised as the provincial administration of Kwangtung. It would be out of the question for the British Government to initiate a proposal to recognise them as more than this. It is for them to ask for a further measure of recognition if they want it, in such a manner
as to permit of consultation with the Powers and the return of such to await
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a reply as might be appropriate after such consultation.
(b) So far as we are aware (vide the enclosure to your despatch of 5th July Secret) the Government of Canton does not want pro- visional recognition de facto (which you suggest should be offered to them) as an independent regional Government. They seem to be aiming at eventual recognition as Chinese Nationalist Government. berlain Jeen But at present we are not asked to accord them such recognition.
proved." 10.P. Nor do they expect us to do so. They are not prepared at present
even to take upon themselves a proportion of national obligations.
(c) The terms of the Tashington Treaty do not permit of either de facto or de jure recognition of independence; and in the event of a claim being put forward by Canton for such recognition as you suggest the Signatory Powers would clearly have to be consulted, before a decision could be arrived at. Even if force of circum- stances should make it necessary for the policy of the British R Government to change in the direction indicated, such far reaching
implications are involved and such debatable questions are raised that the working out and adoption of a new policy would take so long that a solution of the immediate problem of the boycott could clearly not possibly be provided by such developments.
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