J
10
—
We need scarcely say that we do not ask that any voluntary abstention should be "suppressed by force. All that we ask is that an involuntary abstention should not be maintained by force or artificial means. We do not wish to be misunderstood here. We fully realise that a year ago mahy Chinese believed, erroneously as we think, that they had reason for making a protest against the action of various foreign nations in connection with the incidents referred to above. If they had such reason, which we deny, they have mude that protest, in various ways, but we are convinced that the great bulk of the people, always excepting those whose interest it is to maintain the boycott, would now gladly resume normal relations.
It is further alleged in the statemens of the Chinese delegation that "the practical blockade which the Government of Hongkong instituted against Canton and the rest of the province was a powerful predisposing and. later continuing factor in the maintenance and enforcement of the anti-British boycott." an' that "this Hongkong severance of economic relations with Canton suggested the precise form in which patriotic retaliation for June 24 should express itself." This is a good example of putting a had construction on perfectly innocent actions. The Hongkong Government did not institute any blockade of Canton or the rest of the province. Hongkong did not sever economic relations with Canton. The prohibition of the exportation of certain foodstuffs was a measure dictated by com- mon prudence for the purpose of conserving the food supplies of the Colony. By the 22nd June the shipping strike had already begun, and no one knew how far the importation of foortstuffs into the Colony might not be interfered with. If this was a blockade by Hong- kong, it was a blockade of the whole world. The object of the prohibition was shown by the notification of the 11th August, which announced that licences would be given freely for the exportation to all destinations subject to adequate reserves being maintained in the Colony, aid the embargo was wholly removed on the 9th October. The prohibition of the exportation of coin, hullion and notes was a measure of ordinary financial prudence for the
Thus protection of the currency and financial system of the Colony. purely defensive measures, imposed on Hongkong by the strike, are twisted into an attack on Canton. In fact, the statement of the Chinese delegation on this point seems to us to be a desperate attempt to find an excuse and an explanation for the institution and main- tenance of the boycott against Hongkong, a community which had not been concerned in any way with the incidents previously described.
Finally, we take this opportunity to enter an indignant protest against the attempi which has licen made by means of unscrupulous propaganda throughout the course of this unhappy trouble to throw the blame on Ingkong and on the British nation. In truth, the malady of which the Chinese delegation speak is an internal one and will not be cured by attacking the British people, who of all others are most desirous of seeing a happy, pros- perous and independent China with whom they can conduct their trade.
We fully appreciate the fact that the whole outlook of large sections of the Chinese people has changed in recent years, and we sincerely sympathise with the ambition of the Chinese nation to take that great place in the world to which its genius entitles it. The Government of Hongkong, in particular, is prepared to assist in the development of those provinces which the Colony is brought into immediate contact, in any way which may be of mutual benefit, and it is in this direction that we hope a solution of the present difficulties may be found).
No. 6.
STATEMENT
MADE BY THE
CHINESE DELEGATION
AT THE
MEETING OF Wednesday, the 21st July, 1926.
347
As trustees of power on behalf of the Chinese people in the Liang-Kuang, the Nationalist Government sets the utmost value on publicity both as a means of public infor- mation and of mass education and discipline. The beneficiaries must know if we, as trustees, are in serve and not merely to dominate and exploit them, reason of policy that the Chinese Delegation cannot share the objection of the British Is is for this large Delegation to the immediate publication of statements embodying final, and not purely tentative, views on a question of such commu wuding public interest as the anti-British Boy- coll. There is also a specific reason. For more than a year the British press and publicists have exacerbated the public opinion of the world adversely to Canton which has been consistently mis-represented as a centre of senseless hostility and agitation against the British.
It must surely serve the interests not only of historical truth but of this conference if tiction is replaced by fact, and public opiniour is rightly informed as to the true Chinese reasons for the existing anti-British trouble in this territory. We, at any rate, believe in open diplomacy as a necessity of modern government and in publicity generally as the foe of the idols of Occidental prestige and Oriental "face" than which there are no greater obstacles in the transaction of international affairs in the Far East.
It is clearly not within the scope of this Conference to review the Shanghai shooting on May 30 in the souse of an immediate cause of the anti-British boycott in the Liang- Kuang. Reference was made to it in the Chinese statement as but one of the massive features of the **cansal background" ou of which sprang the tragedy of the Shameen on June 23. And it is strictly in this sense that we have to traverse the version of the incident set forth in the British statement and, referring to the so-called vindication of Inspector Evanson by the Shanghai Indicial Enquiry, to emphasize the refusal, of the Chinese people as a whole to have anything to do with the investigation. We agree that "previous ex- perience was utilised in dealing with the anniversary crowd of May 30 at Shanghai, which conelusively proved that a Chinese crowd can be dispersed without invoking the application of the doctrine of the preventive measure. As regards what happened at Hankow the British statement is incomplete without a reference to the double fact that the Chinese crowd was unnurined save as to sticks and poles and that the British forces included British marines armed with quick-liring machine-guns.
We have stated and we repeat that the anti-British boycott has been the immediate and direct outcome of the shooting off the Shameen on June 23. This is the ease CAHAN, If the boycott is to be ended, its cause must be dealt with. But white a con- sideration of this cause involves the question of responsibility as a vital issue, it is im- possible to accept seriously as evidence on the point the allegation that it was celinitely stated in Chinese circles in Canton and Hongkong on June 23rd that an attack was to be made on Shameen on the following day, and prominent Chinese actual- ly took refuge in Hongkong and made other dispositions to meet such an eventuality, This presqmably, is a repetition of part of the then- British Consul-General's disputable story of the events preceding the actual shooting on June 23. The baseless reports in "Chinese circles" and "prominent Chinese" (wealthy and therefore unduly nervous) ruming to Hongkong for refuge should be accepted as evidence of a plan of "attack on Shamcen
is rather a sul commentary on human credibility. But this Shamween gullibility also testifies to the existence of a state and condition of the official mind on June 23 which explains why the events of the day marched to their tragic ending. To the then British Consul-eneral, an attack on the Shameen was an article of faith and, naturally he detected the diabolic intention in most things that came within bis range of vision during the fateful hours immediately preceding the enactment of the tragedy.