4
5253
4450
$9
5.
The second objection taken in the
Foreign Office telegram to a resort to force is
that such action would unite the Chinese against the British and lead to a revival of the boycott throughout the country". In our opinion this objection is valid. We believe that it is now too late for Great Britain by herself alone to take effective warlike action in Kuang-tung without incurring a grave risk of imperilling our future trade relations with China generally and especially with Canton. I have repeatedly dwelt upon this point already and I refer you to the 4th paragraph of my secret despatch of 24th December, the 6th paragraph of my secret despatch of 6th January, the 5th and 6th paragraphs of my secret despatch of the 14th January, the 5th paragraph
$ of my secret despatch of the 26th January and the 2nd paragraph of my secret despatch of 2nd February, We, therefore, agree with Sir R.Macleay and Sir J.Jamieson in deprecating a resort to actual hostilities for the time being. The present position is, however, very critical and it may well be that, even at the risk of imperilling future trade relations with China, Great Britain will be obliged before long to take independent warlike action in Kuang-tung. In that event I invite special attention to my secret despatch of the 19th January, in which I discussed the annexation of the New Territories of Hongkong and the rectification of the British frontier at
Sha-t'au-kok.
xx
PP
6.
leclas
BLOCKADE. - If a blockade of the
West River delta were undertaken by Great Britain alone, there would, we think, be the same risk
Tt.
**
no