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merchants and others suffering from the currency stringency following the crisis. On the 22nd September a deputation from the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce was sympathetically received by His Excellency the Governor and the advisers whom he had called in. I had the privilege of stating the case on behalf of the Chinese. His Excellency lost no time in telegraphing to the Secretary of State for the Colonies in London who in less than 24 hours replied, to the immense relief of the whole com- munity, that the money would be made available in a few days. The immediate financial effect of this Imperial support has been shown in the tone of the Nam Pak Hong market, and the stoppage of panicky withdrawals of deposits from Chinese banks. I cannot express at all adequately the effect on our Chinese community of this great and generous gesture. It is evidence to us of the power of our Governor to secure for us help in time of trouble, and of his willingness to be moved by any reasonable representa- tions from the Chinese. Above all, it has convinced us that the loyalty of the Chinese of the upper and middle classes has been founded on a true estimate of British strength and justice, and of the Government's tender regard for the welfare of the people at all times.
Part III.
REFLECTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.
Success of Our Measures.
78. All the measures described in Part II of this Report, with the exception of the embargo on the export of foodstuffs to Canton (para. 17) and the possible exception of the Telephone Censorship (para. 26), have proved to be, to a larger or smaller extent, efficacious in dealing with the different problems for which they were specially instituted. If some of these measures had been thought of and taken at the commencement of the trouble, it is within the bounds of possibility that some of the unpleasant features which characterised the early stage of the strike would not have appeared.
Necessity for Preparedness.
79. Recommendation: Here I would stress the importance of preparation. Some of the organisations already described are difficult to improvise, and, moreover, the knowledge that they are there ready to function, will prevent attempts at a general strike being lightly undertaken. This is not the last general strike that will be attempted. I would venture to suggest that an intelligent officer might be put permanently on the work of keeping "live" registers of Chinese volunteer workers for essential service, and that as many as possible should be assigned their duties beforehand. A Chinese organisation parallel to the existing European organisation for times of emergency is required. I would also suggest that the successful measures enumerated in Part II, and any others which may appear to be necessary, should be embodied in one comprehensive list, to be ready for use at a moment's notice in case of any threatened strike in future.