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Peking,
No. 326,
May 8, 1920.
[F167;40) io.]
Peking. No. 403,
June 1. 1920. [F1840/407)
Paking, No. 651
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will eventually entail a large expenditure which can best be drawn from the customs. Furthermore, it is indisputable that if the Inspector-General were left to face the Chinese Government-his own employers-without the support of' Diplomatic Body behind him, he would soon cease to exercise any influence over the disposal of the customs releases.”
67. From that date releases of customs surplus have followed one another more or less automatically, always with the allocation of the 137 per cent. to the South, but in May 1920 a complication arose. By that month the Southern Military Government at Canton had collapsed, and the chief leaders of the party, Messrs. Sun Yat Sen, Tang Shao-yi and Dr. Wu Ting-fang had fled from Canton to Shanghai. At the suggestion of Sir B. Alston the last quota of customs revenue allotted to them-- 548,000 taels-was deposited with the Inspector-General of Customs till further notice: and subsequent allocations to the South have been similarly handled.
68. This has led to a series of protests both by the Canton authorities and by the ex-Southern Military Government (Tang Shao-yi, Sun Yat Sen, Wu Ting-fang); for some time these had no effect, but at one moment some of the foreign representatives, principally M. Boppe, French Minister and dean of the Diplomatic Body, began to show signs of indecision. M. Boppe was swayed by a desire to propitiate the South as Sept. 22, 1920, neighbours of French Indo-China. He even suggested at one moment that the Southern allocation should be divided up amongst the various warring factions into which the Southern party had split. But wiser counsels prevailed, and, thanks largely to the firm stand taken by Mr. Clive, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, it was eventually decided to continue to withhold all payments from the South and continue depositing them with Sir F. Aglen.
[P9005, 07/
10.3
This
69. When, in the autumn of 1920, Messrs. Tang Shao-yi, Sun Yat Sen and Wu Ting-fang returned to Canton and re-established themselves as a Southern Government, they sought to revert to the original arrangement and obtain possession of the Southern 137 per cent. of the releases, past and future. But, as they were held by the Diplomatic Body to have no following, their request has been ignored has led to yet a third threat to seize the Southern customs, a threat countered by the immediate intimation of the imminent application of the same counter-measures as contemplated in 1917 and 1918. As in both those years, this intimation has proved sufficient and no attempt has actually been made to interfere with the Customs administration or funds at the Southern ports.
70. According to most recent reports from His Majesty's Legation, the Southern Government are becoming more and more discredited. But, in any case, the question of the allocation of future surplus customs revenue is likely to solve itself. Owing to dropping customs receipts and a heavy fall in silver, customs surplus has now dwindled to a minimum, and there is thus little likelihood of the problem of its disposal arising again in future. As regards the arrears of Southern allocations since May 1920, these have remained in suspense on deposit with Sir F. Aglen until a few days ago, when, with the unanimous consent of the Diplomatic Body, they have been handed over to the Central Government on condition that these funds are devoted to specific objects, such as payment of diplomatic and consular salaries abroad, from which both North and South draw benefit.
71. When, in February last, the American Government, through their Embassy in London, sought to reopen the whole question of the control of these funds by the Diplomatic Body, and appeared to wish to challenge the status of the foreign repre- sentatives at Peking to exercise any further restraint upon the disposal of the customs revenue, they were informed that it seemed to us inopportune, in the real interests of the Chinese people, to modify the existing arrangements, which in practice were working well and equitably.
March 31, 1921.
[F396/246/10]
APPENDIX II.
Memorandum on British Educational Policy in China,
Importance of the Question.
A PERIOD has commenced in China which may be compared to the 1853-1889 period in Japan, and more remotely to the 1453-1595 period in Europe a period of renaissance. The medieval organisation of the country is being transformed by an influx of occidental knowledge. The choice and adaptation of such knowledge to China's needs is therefore the most critical question of the times for China herself; and, further, if during the next fifty or hundred years a united China, a country of 400,000,000 people, were to take a decisive step in the direction of Bolshevism or Christianity, or industrialism, or militarism, or pan-Asianism, a change of paramount importance would be effected in the world's history. It is unlikely that China, still amorphous and aloof, will take any such decisive step, as Japan did in 1868: but before dealing with Chinese education as a matter of commercial or political propaganda, it is as well to reflect on the scope and power of the forces which are being called into existence.
Western education has been propagated in China through two channels : (1) through Chinese who have gone abroad for their studies, mostly to America; (2) through Western educationalists, almost all missionaries, who, for philanthropic By far the greater and religious motives, have devoted themselves to this work. proportion of these are Americans. In fact, Sir J. Jordan (despatch No. 348 of the 23rd July, 1918) states that fully 70 per cent. of the whole foreign education of China is in American hands.
There is a growing chorus of opinion, coming from those educationalists, business men and China experts, who are best qualified to judge, that the time has come when (1) a more definite policy of education for Chinese along British lines should be initiated, (2) voluntary missionary effort should be supplemented and reinforced by a solid endowment, dedicated to this purpose.
in
Mr. Wilton, in his comprehensive report on the subject. enclosed Sir J. Jordan's despatch No. 348 of the 23rd July, 1918, points out three aspects under which the question can be viewed-political, commercial and moral. It is on the second of these considerations that he lays special stress, as offering the most certain return for our outlay. He says: Assuming that China will become an expanding market for British goods, the spread of the English language and British methods in technical and commercial schools in China can hardly, I think, be over- estimated. There would be a distinct tendency, if not even a certainty, for young Chinese, speaking English, accustomed to British machinery, weights, measures and goods, and imbued with British ideas, to promote British enterprises in China. Quite apart from any question of personal sympathies, their mental equipment would make it difficult for them to work with others than Englishmen or Americans.'
For practical purposes, therefore, the commercial aspect should have first consideration; and the first question, which should confront every suggestion for a Government-supported educational scheme in China, is, Will it pay?
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The following quotation from the "United States Commercial Handbook of China (vol. II. p. 420) gives some idea of the commercial and industrial future of the country :-
China is the most populous of Asiatic nations: its trade offers more opportunities than does that of any of the other Far Eastern countries. It is now at the threshold of modern industrialista. Its 6,500 miles of railways must expand to 250,000 miles if it would have a mileage equal to that of the United States; it has a territory one-quarter again as great. Its cotton spindles must increase from 1.500,000 to 50,000,000, its loomis from 5,000 to 800,000 and its textile-mill operatives from 20,000 to several million to equal those of England, which is poorer in potentialities in this industry than is China. Its cotton must increase from 2,500,000 to 12,000,000 bales to equal the United The output States, yet it has the land and labour necessary for this increase. of its coal mines must expand from 15.000,000 tons a year to 700,000,000 tons,
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