280
2
agreement had been reduced to writing and was presented for signature, the point of payment of wages to men who could not immediately be absorbed arose, and at 1 A.M. negotiations practically broke off, as the owners' representative could not agree to committing himself to any payments of that nature. In the course of the discussion, I had put forward the suggestion that a fund for the purpose be started, to which ship- owners, reinstated seamen-out of their increased wages-the Canton Chamber of Commerce, and perhaps the general public, might contribute. This was rejected by all parties at the meeting, but the geru of the idea got abroad, and early in the forenoon of the 5th March Sir Robert Ho-tung caused me to be informed that he would guarantee such a fund to any amount necessary should it be impossible to find any other solution. Another joint meeting of owners and delegates was accordingly called for at 11:30, and by 5:30 P.M. complete accord was reached after I had made my utmost endeavours to bring down the demands of the men. The basis of settlement was a substantial-but
not an exaggerated increase of wages for the men, an immediate return to work, payment of half-wages for a period not exceeding five and a half months to all who could not find immediate re-employment, owing to uncertainty of date of return of vessels on which previously employed, and a calling off by the delegates of the sympathetic strike by all other guilds in Hong Kong, which was to commence at 8 A.M. on the 6th March. The economic side of the dispute having thus been disposed of, the delegates met the representatives of the Government, and an agreement was arrived at in respect of all Governmental questions-such as the reopening of the Seamen's Union, non-punishment of the strikers, &c.-by 8 o'clock. So the strike came to an end, and at 3 A.M. I returned to Canton in H.M.S. ** Moth,'
21
4. It is difficult to convey the nature of the difficulties with which one found oneself confronted. On the one side, a body of men representing fifty-two separate steamship companies engaged in different trades, aul hence with divergent views, some of whom, such as the representatives of the American Shipping Board, Canadian Pacific Steamships, Limited, and the Japanese lines, with instructions from their principals not on any account to increase working costs; on the other, four Chinese seafarers- of the cook and steward type-determined to secure as much as possible for their principals, so that some compensation might accrue to them for weeks of idleness and consequent loss of extraneous profit through trade and smuggling more especially on the Pacific, European and Java lines. (These pay the best wages, but wages are practically of no consirleration to men who can make ten times more than their pay by illicit methods. Yet to them had to be conceded an increase of 15 per cent.)
5. The settlement has been widely and adversely criticised, and those concerned are being held up to obloquy as having ignominiously sacrificed 'ritish prestige. Such criticism is, however, purely destructive. The strike had created a situation of danger so extreme, which, had it not been brought to an end, might have led to a wholesale destruction of British life and property in South China, not to mention a complete paralysis of all activities, commercial and other, in Hong Kong Regarded from a broad point of view the settlement is not an unfair one. Some of the seamen undoubtedly had grievances calling for redress, and, had no provision been made for men not absorbed for long periods, renewed agitation on a large scale would have
sprung up.
6. On looking back the impartial observer cannot help feeling that mistakes have been made on the non-Chinese side. Conversations at the beginning should never have been broken off, as this gave the men an excuse for removing themselves to Canton, where they fell under the influence of the hidden hand, to which reference will be made later on, and the longer they stayed away the more powerful that influence became. Some modus vivendi had to be arrived at, and the longer it was deferred the more difficult and humiliating from the owners' and Government's point of view it became. The closing of the Seamen's Union in Hong Kong, although in the circumstances justifiable and possibly legal, was impolitic. In its fixed determination to "break" the strike, because of its political origin, the Hong Kong Government underestimated the forces to which it was opposed, and the longer the struggle continued the more deadly it became. (Hence the bitterness of partial surrender). To the various appeals which I addressed to the Civil Governor for assistance in getting the men to return to work the invariable reply was: "The men refuse arbitration in Hong Kong; they have reduced their original demands, yet the owners make no counter-offer; in fact, what inducement can I hold out to them? I will maintain order, but I will not use force."
7. There has just reached me a copy of the Hong Kong Government Gazette of the 10th March, which contains a notice of the part played by Government in the
3
negotiations connected with the strike, and which largely amplifies and supplements what has been written above. The account therein given of Mr. A. E. Wood's action is not correct. This most promising officer did not interview General Ch'en prior to the receipt of his instructions. These were brought up to hun by another officer of the Hong Kong Government-Mr. S. B. McElderry- contained in two private letters from his Excellency the Governor to myself. The following day these two gentlemen and the senior vice-consul had an interview with the Civil Governor from 9 A.M. to 10:30 A.M., which was resumed at noon and lasted until about 4 P.M. These conversations were satisfactory on both sides, but in the course of the afternoon newa was received that the shipowners had withdrawn their previous offer, and negotiations consequently broke down.
Mr. Hallifax, the Secretary of Chinese Affairs, who, as tated, came up to explain matters to me, also saw General Ch'en in company with the senior vice-consul,
The general is reported, by one of his secretaries, to have remarked thereafter that the interview had left a bad impression.
(b) Sources of Origin.
and
70-387-28/21
8. Although it may be assumed that in its inception the strike arose out of a genuine grievance on the part of certain seamen with regard to wages, the contention of the Hong Kong Government that it almost immediately assumed the nature of a political movement is perfectly sound. Nor is the reason far to seek. It is simply the outcome of the anomalous state of things which has established two Governments in China, each claiming to be the sole legitimate one, but of which only one is recognised as such by His Majesty's Government. As is well known, many years before the revolution, Sun Yat-sen was the head of a political organisation, which later on developed into that powerful body known as the Kuo-min Tang, with its widespread ramifications amongst the Chinese abroad and in the republic itself, and which is the main instrument through which he is now striving to gain supreme power. Ignoring the debt of gratitude which he owes to Great Britain, Sun has throughout adopted an attitude hostile to her, and more especially towards the colony of Hong Kong for having proscribed him on account of his political activities. The colony he erroneously considers has adopted a policy of trying to debar Canton from obtaining free access to the sea, and of thwarting his grandiose projects of internal development (vide Shanghai despatch, Very Confidential, of the 25th February, 1922, to Hong Kong). This rancour was further increased by the most unfortunate publication on the 6th May, 1921, by the Acting Secretary of Chinese Affairs in Hong Kong, in the name of the Governor, of two notifications in connection with the local inauguration ceremonies on his formally assuming the office of President, coucher in terms derogatory to himself and his Government (vide my despatches Nos. 33 and 34 of the 12th and 13th May, 1921). His 02/2 Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs at the time demanded an apology, but only received an expression of regret. I remember perfectly how, when I told him that regrets were all that Hong Kong had to offer, he drew himself up and said: "Very well. We will remember this." Yet another cause of offence was afforded to Sau's Government in June of last year, when, in spite of repeated protests, the Hong Kong Government refused to remove Yang Yong-tai, who was using the colouy as a base for assisting the Kuangsi party against Kuangtung (vide my despatch No. 47 of the 23rd June and subsequent ones), and I had occasion then to warn the Governor of Hong Kong of the danger of thus increasing the animosity of Canton against his Government. Moreover, as has been repeatedly reported, Sun, ever since his return to South China, has been coquetting with the labour guilds, and in organising them has had the very efficient assistance of one Hsieh Ying-po, a labour agitator trained in the United States of America, aided by Bolshevik emissaries of various nationalities. The most serious local strike fomented by these gentry was the mechanics' strike of May 1921, which was settled by the personal intervention of General Chen Chiung-ming; but in the course of that year there were no fewer than twenty-one other strikes of a minor character (vide list enclosed*), and at the moment of writing the junks conveying rice are on strike.
Que was not, therefore, surprised to find that the seamen's strike in Hong Kong was at once seized on with avidity by the Kuo-min Tang as a means of wreaking Vengeance on Hong Kong, nor that the organising capacity of Hsieh and his co-workers should have brought the weapon to their hand to such a pitch of perfection. It is on these grounds that the long dragging-out of the negotiations is so much to be deplored, inasmuch as it affords the Bolshevik element time to bring the requisite intimidation to bear and to build up the machinery necessary to call out every guild or association in Hong Kong and South China.
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