517
would feel compelled to ask for the return of the island as
well.
19.
It must also be remembered that the island
would be practically useless for the purposes of the Navy unless the possession of it were coupled with the right to
the use of the neighbouring waters, - a use which would need
to be exclusive in order to avoid numerous complications, and there would presumably be considerable difficulty in obtaining such a right. Assuming, however, that these difficulties could be surmounted, I have no doubt that the
best means of providing for the future government would be
to hand the island over to the Naval Authorities entirely, placing the administration under the control of the senior resident navel officer and allowing it to be run on lines similar to those of a militery cantorment. It seems certain, however, that the adoption of this course would involve very much heavier expense to His Majesty's Government than the present arrangement. The revenue of the territory at present is derived almost entirely from the mainland: in 1920-1921 the revenue from the island amounted only to 87,561, made up of House Rents (about $2,500), Crown leases and leases of Government property, and sampan and other licences. This revenue would not be likely to increase. The expenditure on the island amounted in the same year to 841,645. Of this sum about $29,000 was expended on Public Works of a non-recurrent character but it must be expected that expenditure of a similar nature would be necessary from time to time in future so that it can hardly be left entirely out of account. It does not seem probably that the recurrent expenditure on the administration of the island would be reduced if it were handed over to the Naval Authorities since the present civil police, sanitary staff, etc., would have to be retained or replaced by Naval Ratings, who would probably be more expensive; and indeed it is likely
that