*
..
3
451
The principle • you have to choose between trading
with the Allies or with their enemies, in which latter case
you must take the consequences of your own doings", is
not only quite comprehensible to the Dutch trading chracter
but even acceptable, albeit that such an expression of
power in a country strategically stronger than Java
probably could not pass muster from a political point of view.
As it may safely be stated that most of the sugar
sellers in Java are *Pro-Allies" a simple official
cnnouncebunt
saying that the sale of sugar to German fires
would lead to putting the seller on the Black List would have
sto, ed the whole trade with Black-listed firms, for nobody
could risk being put on the Black List for the above mentioned
reasons (sulphate of ammonia & gunny bags) and ould have
fallen on good soil here, on account of the anti-German feeling
of the trade" oopecially since the publicity of the
conspiracy at Buitenzorg.
Fere then was the oportunity by which the object
could have been reached by putting to the test the well-known
expression "prevoir c'est gouverner" an. Iregret that in this instance my advice was not followed by the British Consul
General in Batavia,
Now the Ned, Handel My & the Hvg "Amsterdam" are up in
arms, both very influential concerns (part of the British
Government's purchase of sugar is being financed through the
first named), who, with that obstinate tenacity which is
so typical of the Dutch charecter lf in any way touched on the
raw, will adopt a hostile attitude where formerly their
valuable co-operation was to be relied upon.
Now a caution against selling to bisck-listed firms
is only warranted, if the British Con ul General as the