The point between us then is:
Could Germany have prevented this War; did she try to do so?
When I wrote to Shanghai on the 11th September I had had before me a peaceful England, nobody having even dreamt of war until the very last days before its outbreak (so different from what I had observed in Germany already weeks before), and I had before me the German White-Book which, as X.... knows, was sent to me almost immediately after its publication in August last. Surely I could take no fairer evidence to rely on!
In that Book it is stated, on page 4:
"We were perfectly aware that a possible warlike attitude of Austria-Hungary against Servia might bring Russia upon the field, and that it might therefore involve us in a war, in accor- dance with our duty as allies."
and on page 7:
“As we know the obligations of France to- wards Russia, this (Germany's) mobilisation would be directed against both Russia and France." The query arises, as Germany knew that Russia and France would be involved if Austria adopted a warlike attitude against Servia, why did she—the pre- dominant and mighty partner-not prevent her ally launching out a peremptory demand for an uncon- ditional acceptance by Servia, within a mere 48 hours, of a complicated "Note" of nearly 50 paragraphs!
How could Germany complain if Russia did mobilise after such a demand?
You are, however, aware that this mobilisation by Russia, who did not accept Austria's "official explana- tion to Russia that she did not claim territorial gain in Servia," is held by Germany to be the of the war. After that, so the White-Book proceeds: "the decision concerning the peace of the World rested exclusively with Russia.“
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How could Russia be expected to "cease every measure of war against Austria?" That was, however, what Germany demanded. According to that White- Book the Kaiser replied to the Czar's telegram of the 31st July:
"I have shown yesterday to Your Government the way through which alone war may yet be averted..." (viz: "for Russia to stop every measure of war against us and against Austria-Hungary within 12 hours and notify us definitely to that effect").
The "Note" to Servia-it is nothing but an ul- timatum--was presented in Belgrade on the 23rd July, and small wonder that she started mobilising the next day.
What could and did Austria expect otherwise? Surely not an unconditional acceptance of all the terms of these 50 paragraphs, a demand for acceptance with- in a mere 48 hours by a Balkan Government whose procrastinating instincts nobody knows better than Austria.
Therefore she did mean war and Germany did not prevent her although she knew that would involve Russia and France, and Germany herself!
And what is the practical value of an explana- tion by a country (Austria) "that it does not claim territorial gain" if its troops are intent upon killing the people of the other country and occupying its capital?
How easily can such a declaration be evaded afterwards! The White-Book states, however, that after this explanation "the decision concerning the peace of the World rested exclusively with St. Petersburg!"
The Czar's telegram (31st July), to which the Kaiser replied as quoted above, reads:
"I have received Your telegram.
I comprehend that You are forced to mobi- lise, but I should like to have from You the same guarantee which I have given You, viz., that
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