had not intended to uphold Belgian neutrality. She however conveniently overlooks that any military ar- rangements, made by England in regard to Belgium, were only provisional-to provide for and to guard against the very contingency which did arise, namely this violation by Germany of Belgian neutrality. To provide for this, was of course the bounden duty of the British Government.
I must, at any rate, be excused if I hold that such and similar arguments, by which one tries to fix this terrible responsibility upon others, are valueless. I have heard of none of a more concrete value. And why have none of the important diplomatic despatches between Berlin and Vienna been published? They could prove a great deal!
I must be allowed to refrain from fully replying to the complex historical questions raised by our mutual friend. I must leave that to more able and leisured people. I am too busy, even at home where I am writing this, to allow myself to be drawn into lengthy controversy because I once, in an entirely impersonal and obviously friendly manner, stated views about the cause of the war when I was obliged to write about its disastrous "effect" upon mutual business.
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All I stated in that Shanghai letter, was my belief (subject to correction by later history) that the Prussian militarists could have prevented the war had they wished to; and I thought it would help to lessen any bitter feeling, that might arise during the war, if those of our oversea customers whom Fate and Prussia have turned against us knew that we here, in this country, sympathised with the individual German, as distinct from the Prussian military caste which appeared to be as much his own enemy as ours.
At any rate, I preferred to be frank instead of screening myself behind a doubtful and hypocritical silence as to my own feelings in this far reaching world-crisis.
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I never said as X. assumes -nor did thinking people in England-that this war was being waged by England for Servia, or only because Germany violated Belgian neutrality, though that happened to be the
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casus belli." The reason why England joined in the war in my opinion is well expressed in the following short letter, written on that fateful 2nd day of August by our two Conservative statesmen (the leaders of the Opposition) to the Prime Minister:
"Dear Mr. Asquith,
Lord Lansdowne and I feel it our duty to inform you that in our opinion, as well as in that of all the colleagues whom we have been able to consult, it would be fatal to the honour and security of the United Kingdom to hesitate in supporting France and Russia at the present juncture; and we offer our unhesitating support to the Government in any measure they may consider necessary for that object.
Yours very truly,
A. Bonar Law."
War had then been declared by Germany against Russia on the previous day and was formally declared upon France on the following day. France's northern coasts were unprotected, her fleet was concentrated in the Mediterranean trusting that England, though not bound to do so, would help France in case of an unprovoked attack upon her.
England's ultimatum to Germany followed only on the 4th August, after Germany had declined "to give the same assurance respecting Belgium as France gave last week in reply to our request, made simultaneously at Berlin and Paris," as that ultimatum stated.
Of course, England would not have gone to war because of this violation as such, but because of its likely consequences—namely a probable German victory over Belgium, France and Russia. That would obviously have threatened British interests!
It is true that our Prime Minister, perhaps for reasons connected with domestic politics (so frequently a puzzle to other nations), did not at first sufficiently
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