theasure
+
as
to the provisions of
which
questions have since been
0
by caised and fencefable
307
of
abuse by Euclitary Anthrition.
(2) Hat the peculiar native of the population of
Khing does not, as
A
we have founted out, constitute secial protem, needing very careful handling: and wathy) in general, colonial populations
But much
the same in character, and likely to be treated with
the same consideration, as the population of the U.x. -
Though the attitude
J
The G.o.c.
20. C. at Haphing has shoon
tat subordinate antitary officers would not be prevented
from doing the most injudicions thing.
Selas
It is fortunate that the Eow. If A Ring cafalle D. Wolding his own for the win.
If the Aring Act
syarding the "potable effect I, of applied to the civil population
ar
A
academic question: and perhaps, fending
!
decision of the
-purely
more general question, we might
? hill the Gov. that the S. GS. considers
the attitude he has taken up to be correct, and that it should be meintained until
2
definite
धि
decision by HMM. C. on the interpretation of the O. al. in reached : sending cozy of their hatten & saying that 155.0%. does not find himself in apeet with
8
the interpretation of the words "military operations"
adopted by the W.0. make despatch confidential)
(This ought to encourage him to maintain his stand
while we communicate furtner with W.0.).
H.B.
12/4/15.
As far as Hong Kong is concerned I think
we ought soon to be able to terminate
this correspondence. The War Uffice admit, see
paragraph 5 of this letter, that in regard to Hong
•
Kong there may possibly be no immediate need for special action and although we must contest the
general propositions laid down in paragraph 2 of the
letter, I think we ought to be able to force them to
drop the agitation about Hong Kong.
With regard to paragraph 2, the War Office interpretation of "military operations" appears to consist in throwing over all they have adritted im.ediately before. It appears for instance to follow from their statement that matters remotely affecting the success of military operations must
be regarded as immediately connected with military operations, which sourds rather inconsistent. Moreover, the last example which they give at the end of the para raph("seizing of land or material for naval or military purposes") is not fortunately chosen forbre goopdety since these powers are expressly conferred upon the Governor by Article 3 (6) and (7) of the Order in Council. They can, therefore, hardly be conferred on the military authorities by Article 3(1). Moreover, it is
difficult