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I suppose it requires no argument to support the position that if during the troubles which succeeded the Franco-German
War, the extradition of any person, even a Frenchman, had been
asked for the English Courts would have declined on habeas
corpus for this simple reasons there were no ordinary Courts.
So when martial law has been proclaimed in any country they will
certainly with regard to a foreigner refuse the surrender for
the same reason, and I doubt not also with regard to a subject.
I submit it is impossible to conceive of extradition to a country
og any person in which there is either a revolution or rebellion
of any magnitude, It is equally impossible to conceive when
martial law, which is the offspring of rebellion, has been
procalimed; and this, not merely because of the ruthless nature
of the decisions of the martial Courts. There is another
reason which brings this question nearer to principles recog-
mised by the law of extradition. Rebellions are the highest
form of political agitation: a non-pèlitical rebellion is an
impexutitty impossibility. Martial law is reported to for the
purpose of stamping out the rebellion, as the most expeditious
and effective way of punishing the rebels, and that characteris-
tio is preserved so long as martial law continues. It is not
possible to conceive of martial law unconnected with acute
political agitation.
And while iƒ lasts it is inevitable that,
since rebellion is based on crime, the martial Courts see a
rebel in every criminal and treat him accárdingly: the treat-
mont being familiarly known as "shooting at sight".
I
I have borught the proposition for which I am contending
within the region of the principles governing extradition.
propose now to put it on a more soild basis of a substantive
legal principle sztradition is based on the assumption of
@quality of constitutional treatment of the fugitive surrendereć
To put it into simpler language, just as extradition ia, na I
kave shown, based on the existence of peace, so it also depends
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