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which the Act holds in the subject cannot be appreciated unless it is borne in mind that Parliament has nothing to any to the surrender to England of fugitive by other contracting Powers; and the Act, except for one section (s.19) which deals with a special detail, leaves untouched the other side of the treaties; it does not even give directions as to the manner in which the requisition to fareign countries is to be made. The Act being then simply and solely machinery, I am justified in saying that extradition in its very existance and in all its details is
entirely a matter for the prerogative. And as the Courts take notion of the prerogative, the reason why they must discharge a fugitive in time of war between England and the requesting is clearly apparent: the prerogative itself has suspended the treaty. From this to my second position the transition is sim-
ple, and the justification for
it easy. To revert to my con- orete caso, a war between France and Spain; on the outbreak of
the war the King will have proclaimed his neutrality, and it would be a violation of his neutrality to surrender a Spaniard
a France or a Frenchman to Spain. The practical justification
of the proposition in reason is not far to geek. I have already
pointed out the inenviable position in which the subjects of one
belligerent find themselves when they are in the country of the
⚫nomy. It might be of the utmost importance for, say, France to
obtain possession of a prominent or wealthy Spaniard who had
come over to England. Now, even putting the proposition on one
side, is it mot clear that the Court would of necessity exercise
the most careful vigilance in order to prevent the surrender of
such a fugitive charged even with the most ordinary crime lest
the requisition should have been made with a view" to treat him
as an enemy when they had got him. They would almost be bound
to assume that he would be; for it is difficult to imagine that
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