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And first let me refer the Court to the Petition of Right in order to show how important a part peace plays in the exer- cise of one of the prerogatives. One of its clauses provided against the enforcement of martial law in time of peace; and there can be no doubt that this applied both to the law martial as well as to mertial law in its strict sense. On this subject there is a pregnant remark of Lord Halsbury in Marais v. General Commanding Lines 1902 (71 L.J.P.C. at P. 46) "The framers of the
Petition of Right know very well what they were about when they limited the unconstitutional exercise of the prerogative to times of peace". This illustrates very clearly the position,
the natural position, which peace occupies in regard to the
exercise of the prerogative in time of war; the question with which I am dealing is the converse, the position which wa
occupies in regard to the exercise of the prerogative in time of
peace. In both cases I have no doubt that, the occasion arising
the Courts all recoginse and give affect to that position.
In order to appreciate the true reason or the latter pos
proposition, which is the one with which I am dealing, it is
necessary to bear in mind the fundamental principle on which
extradition is based. It is dependent on an exercise of the
treaty-making prerogative; it does not depend, as is so often
assumed, on the Act of Parliament. By which I mean, the Act
does not authorise the making of the treaties, not yet ratify
them orsancțion them after they have been made. The Act is only
required in order to authorise the executive to carry out the
engagements made by the King, without which authorisation those
engagements, -- the principle of which is the arrest of a man in
England who has committed no offence against English law
could not be carried out. It also indicates the limits
which those engagements will be carried out. But the position
within
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