[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]
LBJ
AFFAIRS OF CHINA,
CONFIDENTIAL.
[51662]
No. 1.
362
[December 27.]
SECTION 1.
(No. 490.) Sir,
Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 27.)
Peking, December 8, 1911. WITH reference to my telegram No. 323 of the 5th instant, I bave the honour to transmit to you herewith copies of two communications which my Japanese colleague handed to me on that day. In furnishing me with these documents Mr. juin explained that his Government had come to the conclusion that the time had arrived when foreign intervention was imperatively required to restore order in China, and he invited an expression of my views on the situation. After a necessarily cursory perusal of the papers, I said that in the main I agreed with the statement marked (A), which seemed to me to convey an accurate description of the situation. The only point on which I might be inclined to differ from the Japanese view was with regard to the action of Yuan Shih-kai, who appeared to me to have accomplished more than the paper gave him credit for.
As regards (B), I fully shared the Japanese view that a constitutional Government under the nominal sovereignty of the Manchus offered far the best solution of the crisis, and I felt sure that this opinion would be endorsed by the majority of our colleagues. But we had to reckon with the fact that all the provinces south of the Yang-tsze had declared for a republican form of Government, and that the Manchu Yuan Shih-kai himself seemed to dynasty was discredited throughout the country. have little hope of gaining the adhesion of all parties to the continuance of the present régime, and had been working for some time past to secure the abdication of the Regent, with the view of convincing the country that Manchu rule would for the future exist only in name. An armistice had been arranged at Hankow, and steps were being taken to bring the parties together to give them an opportunity of composing their differences. The object of the Japanese proposal was, therefore, to a certain extent, being realised, and it seemed advisable to await the result of this conference before resorting to the measures suggested by the Japanese Government. The prospect of a settlement was admittedly slight, but such as it was, it seemed better to utilise it than incur all the risks and complications which foreign intervention necessarily entailed.
Mr. Ijuin fully agreed, and explained that he did not interpret the Japanese state. ment as contemplating immediate action. The attitude of his Government he thought was rather one of preparation for eventual contingencies in the not unlikely event of the Chinese failing to come to any decision themselves.
I asked Mr. Ijuin if he had any knowledge of the steps which the Imperial Govern- ment contemplated in the last resort, and he replied in the negative. But he assumed that armed interference would be the necessary sequel of failure to effect a peaceful solution.
I remarked that the prospect of employing coercion to force upon so many millions of people a form of Government to which they objected raised such a grave issue that I hardly ventured to contemplate it, Great Britain, especially, would probably find such a task one of great delicacy, in view of the fact that the bulk of the Chinese population at Singapore and Hong Kong openly sympathised with the revolutionary cause. It therefore seemed all the more incumbent upon us to do all in our power to avert such a contingency by facilitating direct negotiations between the two parties to the struggle.
The day after my interview with my Japanese colleague, the edict, copy of which is enclosed, was issued by the Empress-Dowager, announcing the formal abdication of the Regent and appointing two high officials, one Manchu and one Chinese, to be guardians of the Emperor. The conduct of the Government is to be carried on by the Prime Minister and the Ministers of the Cabinot, while the Empress-Dowager and the Emperor will preside at audiences and ceremonial functions,
[2289 dd-1]
B