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structed from (1) Peking to Harbin (via Jehol and Tao-nan-fu), and (2) from Tsitsihar
to Mergen.
He was promised an opportunity of discussing the matter with M. Stolypin, and was told that the project would be laid before the Council of Ministers.
Russia has recently sent a commission to those regions to investigate, and it is perhaps not too much to suppose that M. Kokovtsoff's inclination to favour the present scheme is based on its report.
The following considerations may throw some light on Russia's attitude, and I have drawn up the accompanying rough map in order to illustrate them.
1. By the Secret Russo-Japanese Agreement of 1907 (confirmed in 1910) spheres of influence were established in Manchuria, but the line of demarcation of these spheres From the stopped short to the westward at the parallel of 122 cast of Greenwich. maps available here it is impossible to locate Tao-nan-fu exactly, but it appears to lie very near that parallel and the projected railway, could probably be so arranged as not to encroach anywhere on the Japanese sphere.
In
2. By the same secret agreement Russia is given a free hand in Outer Mongolia. Moreover, according to Lord french, she holds an option for a line from Hailar to Peking, and on M. Kokovtsoff's own showing, she is afraid of Japan, and convinced that sooner or later the whole of Southern Manchuria will fall to the Japanese. these circumstances, the advantage to Russia of a Chinese railway running up between her sphere of influence in Mongolia and the Japanese sphere of Southern Manchuria is obvious. The Chinese line would, the Chinose hope, aot as a colouising factor, and. if this hope is realised, a wedge of thickly-populated Chinese territory would be driven in between Russia and Japan.
3. The difficulty of supplying Vladivostock with meat has long been a much- discussed problem. At the time of the Russo-Japanese war, ment went up to famine prices, and all the deer on the outlying islands were killed off to supply the town. The lines from Mergen to Tsitsihar and from Tao-nan-fu to Harbin, would both tap rich cattle districts, and their construction would greatly assist in the solution of the problem.
4. The strategic value of the line to Russin would be considerable. It would give her direct and rapid communication with Peking, without touching anywhere on Japanese lines or spheres of influence, and it would not be open to Japanese attack
from the sea.
Other points to consider are the probable attitudes of the Japanese and Chinese.
1. The Japanese will probably object strongly, but if the line is kept carefully to the nest of the 122nd degree of longitude and is supported by the Russians, it is hard
to see how, in view of the terms of their secret agreement with Russia, they can veto the construction of the line.
2. The one aim and object of the Chinese is to save some part of Manchuria before it is too late. They propose to do this by a system of colonisation. The Chinchow- Aigun schemo would probably have been more effective for this purpose, and the port on the Gulf of Pe-chi-li was doubtless an attraction, but that scheme has for the present been absolutely retoed, and the suggested alternative line has its advantages. It would probably be a good deal more costly to build, and its strategic value to Russia might militate against it in the eyes of the Chinese, but on the other hand it would have its terminus in the capital, would be comparatively safe from the Japanese, would open up new country, and would be connected with a ready-made port at Tient-sin, the trade of which it would doubtless do much to foster,
P.S.-Since writing the above, I have again seen Lord ffrenek, who tells me that on the 4th April he was received by M. Stolypine. M. Stolypine assured him that he personally was in favour of the scheme, but said that he could not give him a definite reply in the name of the Government until he had talked the matter over with the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Ministers of Finance and War.
* In 1903 Mr. Claud Russell and the Hou, Michael Hicks-Doach travelled from Peking to Tsitsihar viù Jakol, following in their first stages very much the line which the projected railway world take. I believe Mr. Rossell furnished a short report of his journey to the Foreign Ofice and pablished an account of it in the Geographical Journal." The country, even fo-day, is very little known, and these accounts might be of interest.
\Urga •
Frontier of spheres of influence laid down by Russo-Japanese Secret Convention in 1907 and confirmed in 1919.
Pailing's new project for lines from Peking to Harbin (via Jehot and Tas- nan-fù) and from Morgen to Tsitsihar,
(36 stu koljka 1985 ki
Poking
Parallel E. of Greenwich.
Amur R.
Aigun
Merge
Hailar
·
Tola
Tapnenfu
Sungari k
larbin
anese Railway
Russian Rly
Kwangcher
Fakumen
Mukden
Jehol
Newchwang
Tien tsi
Port Arthur
Parallel E. of Greenwich, being the Western ex tremity of the lines deferring the Russian and japanese spheres of interest.
COREA
L.Birtin
.Hunchun
Amur R
Vladivostok
SECRET
514
The Chinchou-Aigun project vetoed by Russia, and accepted by Japan an condition that a connecting link be construched with the S. Manchurian Kailway.
5. Manchurian Ruilany, etc. (Japanese).
Chines Eastern Railway, etc. (Russian),
Projected line prom Matlar to Peking, for which Busia is said to hold the option.
Hum-min-12-2łakumun project, velved by
Japan.
North China Railway (Chinese).