·
466
}
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considered should be made of the Chinese Government has yet to be seen. Judging, however, by the attitude adopted by these authorities during the negotiation last year of the revised Sungari regulations and bearing in mind the recent action of the Russian Government in regard to the demands formulated in the note which the Russian Minister addressed to the Wai-wu Pu on the 16th February, it would seem not unlikely that the Russian authorities will endeavour to exact from the Chinese Government as many concessions as they may feel themselves strong enough to extort. It is an interesting circumstance that the ideas of the Russian authorities and those of the Chinese in desiring the revision of the treaty of 1881 are diametrically opposed. The Chinese deluded themselves into thinking that the revision of the treaty would afford them an opportunity for curtailing the special privileges hitherto accorded to Russia. The Russians regard the occasion as one of which every advantage should be taken to secure for themselves further concessions. It is difficult, even on the showing of the Russian Chamber of Commerce at Harbin,. to see what benefit is to accrue to China in return for the grant of the additional facilities for Russian trade which it is sought to obtain from her. The Imperial maritime custom-houses in the Harbin district have been a greater mine of wealth than was anticipated and the Chinese Government will not want to lose, even in part, a sure source of revenue and one of which they stand much in need.
Reverting to the subject of the demands contained in the Russian note to China of the 16th February, it is noteworthy that the first, which has reference to the free zones and which did not apparently meet with any objection from the Chinese Government, gives to the wording of the Aigun treaty of 1858 the wider interpretation which it received in the revised Sungari regulations of last year, a matter to which I have referred in the memorandum herein enclosed. It is not now necessary that the place of origin of the goods should be situated within the free zone of one country in order that these goods may be exempt from duty when exported to the free zone of the other thus, grain sent from Harbin to Blagovestchensk is free. The Chinese Government, in their reply to the Russian note of the 16th February, ignore the claim preferred in the third demand that Russian trade with Mongolia shall not be hampered by monopolies or other restrictions. It seems, though I am not certain, that one of the chief reasons for this demand is the objection which the Russian authorities take to the levy of duty upon "Russian" tea imported into Mongolia. The Chinese, apparently, endeavour to justify their action on the ground that the tea in question is a Chinese product-as, in fact, it is. Much of this tea is taken by sea to Vladivostock whence it is sent by rail to Manchuria station and Russian places west of that point, from which, after repacking, it is exported to Mongolia. There is nothing unusual, especially where it is a question of customs procedure, in the provenance of one country being treated as that of another, and the Imperial Maritime Customs, for example, itself treats as foreign goods native articles exported to China proper from Hong Kong and Vladivostock.
Whether or not there is any real necessity for the establishment of Russian consulates at Kobdo, Hami, and Gutchen (Kucheng), all of which are situated in Sinkiang or the New Dominion, I cannot say; but, whatever the justice of some of Russia's demands, one cannot fail to be struck by the obvious insincerity of the statement contained in the concluding paragraph of China's reply, namely, that " it has always been the policy of the Chinese Government to be guided in all matters by treaty stipulations." It does not require me to say that the Chinese Government and the Chinese officials in general seek, and avail themselves of, every possible opportunity of breaking their treaty engagements with foreign Powers.
I heard it stated yesterday-with how much truth I do not know-that the six matters mentioned in the Russian note of the 16th February do not represent all the demands which have already been presented to China in connection with the coming revision of the 1881 treaty.
It is indeed said that, in all, thirty-five requests have been preferred; six of which refer specially to Manchuria. This information, as above interred, is very probably not strictly accurate; but seeing that the Russian Government has for some time past been acquainted with the views of local merchants as explained in the annexes attached to the memorandum enclosed in this despatch, it would seem quite possible that certain assurances in regard to Manchurian matters have been demanded and given. There is also, ride my despatches Nos. 40 and 44 dated respectively the 9th November and the 6th December last, the question of the disputed frontier line in the neighbourhood of Manchuria station, that of an effective quarantine system on the Sungari, Ussuri, and Amur Rivers, and along the Russo-Chinese land
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frontier and that of the Aigun regulations of 1909, a modification of which is, as reported in my despatch No. 38, Confidential, of the 5th November last, desired.
The whole situation, which I propose to pass in brief review, appears, so far as I can judge it here, one from which China can derive but little comfort. Once again she is paying the penalty of the tortuous policy which she has seen fit to pursue in Manchuria for some years past, and Russia, fortified by her present understanding with Japan, is adopting an attitude similar to, though stronger than, that which she assumed on the occasion of the revision last year of the Sungari regulations of 1909. China, when establishing these regulations, affected to ignore her treaty obligations to Russia, and to disregard in high-handed fashion the actual position; she later discovered her mistake, and was forced, if a colloquialism may be permitted, to "eat humble pic." The result of China's ill-considered section of regard to this and other questions, into the details of which it is not necessary to enter, was the Russo- Japanese agreement of the 4th July last, some of the fruits of which have already beeu plucked. This agreement appears to me to be the pivot of the present situation, and to be a feature which is peculiarly disquieting. It seems impossible that Russia's recent action towards China can have been taken without Japan's knowledge and approval, and it is not easy to think that Japan will be content to remain long inert and allow Russia to be the sole beneficiary. At the present moment it may suit Japan that Russia should stand in the forefront and be the first to reap the reward of victory. But it is to be feared that sooner or later, and possibly unostentatiously, Japan will demand and obtain from China what she considers to be her just due. Japan has many irons in the fire in Manchuria, and it would be strangely unlike her usual conduct if she did not make the best of her opportunities. It may be of course that Russia is already aware of the professed intentions of Japan; but, even so, the cause of apprehension in so far as China is concerned is not removed.
There is another aspect to the Russo-Japanese agreement and that is the effect which it may eventually have on the mutual relations of the two contracting parties. This is a matter to which I had the honour to refer in my confidential despatch No. 41 of the 17th November last, wherein mention was made of the superior qualities of the Japanese and of the danger to which Russia is exposed by the arrangement into which she thought it advisable to enter. I have since heard similar fears expressed by responsible Russians who are acquainted with the local situation, and who are not anxious to see Russia become the catspaw of Japan. The projected extension of the Kirin-Changchun Railway from Kirin vià Yên Chi to Huining, to which I had the honour to refer in my despatch No. 10 of the 16th instant, and other signs of Japanese activity in the neighbourhood of the Chientao and Hunchun frontier, are, owing to the proximity of Novo Kievsk, Possiet, and Vladivostock, regarded with apprehension, and I would here beg a reference to my confidential despatches Nos. 19 and 28 dated respectively the 24th July and the 13th September last. Anxiety also exists lest Japan's object in encouraging and supporting Russian aims and ambitions in the north of the province be to enable her to strengthen and consolidate her position in the south so that she may be better able to ultimately dispute with Russia the ownership of the north.
It remains to consider the effect which the further expansion of Russian trade and influence in Northern Manchuria is likely to have upon the prospects and interests of British merchants. The character of the Russian, concerning which some remarks were made in my confidential despatch No. 41 before mentioned, is not such as to enable him to rank for ability and energy with the merchants of other foreign nationalities. Provided, then, that they are given equal rights of trade and residence, and are allowed to remain under the jurisdiction of their own authorities, British inerchants have, I am disposed to think, little to fear from the further expansion of Russia in the north of Manchuria beyond the inevitable advantage which she derives from her geographical position, a matter which is, however, of very considerable importance, and the fact that commercial dealings with the Russians themselves are somewhat difficult.
I have, &c.
H. E. SLY,
T
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