confirms the opinion stated in my despatch No. 30, that the recent Russo-Japanese agreement-whatever its present advantages, and upon these I shall presently touch- is merely a temporary expedient, and cannot endure as a lasting compact. It is interesting also to recall the extract from an article which appeared earlier in the year in the "Nova Zizn," and which was embodied in my despatch No. 11 of the was the recently-established Russo- 11th May last. The writer, whose theme Japanese society at Harbin and the movement towards a rapprochement between the two nations, frankly admitted that the Japanese were more thorough and more fanatically patriotic than the Russians, and would get the better of the bargain. My experience in Northern Manchuria, which will soon have extended over a year, has led me to think that this apprehension is well founded. The Russian, though not wanting in foresight and mental capacity generally, lacks application, and his practical ability is not commensurate with his powers of thought and conception. Herein would appear to lie his chief danger in respect of an alliance concluded between him and the Japanese with a view to protecting both against what was held to be a common peril, namely, the loss or curtailment of their vested and hard-earned interests in Manchuria. The Russian is not so thorough and painstaking as the Japanese, and though he has immense resources and his position in the Far East will be materially strengthened by the construction of the Amur Railway and the improved fortification of Vladivostock, he will need to spare no precautions and to encourage and develop a spirit of thoroughness and a capacity for application if he does not wish his present bargain with his recent enemy, however temporary he may intend or desire it to be, to ensure eventually to his own disadvantage. In no other place in which I have lived have I experienced the same difficulty in securing the performance of any matter, however simple, and whether of a business or ordinary nature as in Harbin: procrastination is the order of the day and efficiency a quality which is seldom encountered. From foreigners of all descriptious and nationalities one invariably hears the same disparaging remark-"the Russian is quite useless." I have had no close acquaintance with the Japanese, but as far as I can judge of their work in Manchuria, there can be no doubt as to their efficiency or progress. Their position in this province-already very strong by reason of their hold on the leased territory of Kuantang, their possession of the South Manchurian and Antung- Mukden railways, and their interest in the Kirin-Chiang Ch'un line, which, if the rails are of a different standard weight, is of the same gauge as the South Manchurian Railway-has been still further strengthened by the final and definite absorption of Corea. The north and north-eastern portion of Corea borders upon Chientao and Hunchun, and my confidential despatches Nos. 19 and 28 of the 24th July and 13th September last, reporting on these districts, made mention of their utility as a striking base against Vladivostock, Novo Kievsk, and Possiet, and also referred to the number of Coreans which was moving into them from across the border. Now that Corea is part of the Japanese Empire the consolidation of Japan's position along the Tiumen will be facilitated, and it may be anticipated that the mantle of protection which she has hitherto thrown over Corean subjects resident in China will be extended. If newspaper report speaks true, this matter has, in fact, already demanded attention, and the instruction issued by the Manchurian Viceroy to his subordinates is to mark time and endeavour to avoid giving rise to any question pending the consideration of the subject by the Chinese and Japanese Governments. The Japanese are not likely to fail to take advantage of any circumstance which will increase their influence in Manchuria, and which will furnish them with another weapon against China as occasion serves.
Epitomising the foregoing remarks, the position reached is that the Japanese and Russians, the former by its annexation of Corea and the latter by its military measures, have shown that they are both fully alive to the necessity for strengthening their position in and in the neighbourhood of Manchuria, and that the superior qualities of the Japanese provide a distinct element of danger for Russia in her recent compact with her former foe, against which every precaution should for her own protection be taken. It will be useful, before proceeding to deal with other factors in the situation, to give specific instances which occasion and confirm the apprehension that the Japanese and not the Russians will be those to extract the greatest benefit from the arrangement which has been made between them.
In
Recent numbers of the "Manchuria Daily News" have contained the statement that the Japanese Government proposes next year to open a consulate at Aigun. conversation with my Japanese colleague, I enquired whether this report was correct. Mr. Kawakami did not himself see that any good purpose could be served by opening
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a consulate at Aigun, which lies on the opposite bank of the river to, and about 35 versts (23 miles) below, Blagovestchensk. His Government had, however, approached the Chinese Government with a request to be allowed to station a consular officer at Taheiho, but the Chinese Government had declined to accede to it. Taheiho not Aigun-vide my despatch No. 38 of the 5th instant-is the place where trade centres, and in indicating it for a consular post the Japanese authorities show that they are fully acquainted with local conditions. There are, according to the Japanese consul-general, 200 Japanese subjects at Taheiho, which is an Imperial Maritime Customs barrier, and 500 at Blagovestchensk. A consul at Taheiho could also keep watch and ward over his nationals resident in the Russian town across the river. In futher conversation with my colleague a few days back, he introduced the subject of the delays and difficulties encountered at Harbin by passengers from Europe bound for the south-we had both of us the previous evening experienced the inconveniences of the present system or lack of system--and stated that he contem- plated writing to the South Manchurian Railway Company, and urging them to send an official to Harbin to render assistance to southward-bound passengers and accompany them on their journey to Chang Ch'un. It seems unlikely that two years ago, for example, the Japanese authorities would have thought such a step either politie or advisable, though it must not be forgotten that the European expresses as far as Ch'ang Ch'un are now under "wagons-lits" management. Again, report has it that the Japanese are moving into North Manchuria in considerably greater numbers than previously, and a matter of no little interest-particularly in view of the explanation of its cause-is the recent establishment at Dairen of a branch of the Russian firm of Tchurin, a large general store established at Harbin, Vladivostock, Blagovestchensk, Nikolsk, Larbarovsk, and other places. Speaking with a member of the local branch of the firm a short time back, he told rue that the firm, which in one year, I think it was last year, had a turn-over of 2,500,000 roubles at Harbin and 4,000,000 at Vladivostock, was about to open at Dairen, where the first steamer bringing a large consignment of goods for the firm to that port was then due. He was himself bound for Dairen to make all the necessary arrangements, and their intention was, if possible, to import all their goods for Harbin viâ Dairen, and not viå Vladivostock, as hitherto. The present was a trial shipment, and the reason for the change was the protracted delays and numerous difficulties, some of which he enumerated, with which they had to contend at the latter port.
The step contemplated by Messrs. Tchurin is of no little significance, and the result, if the venture prove successful, will be this: a Japanese port and transportation over two lines of rail, Japanese and Russian, necessitating a transfer of the goods from the Japanese to the Russian line at Chang Ch'un give greater facilities for the importation of goods to a Russian firm doing a large business at Harbin than a Russian port with direct Russian railway communication to the place of destination. The distance by rail from Vladivostock to Harbin is 483 miles and from Dairen 585, and I understand that, according to present arrangements, freights from Europe to the latter are somewhat higher than to the former. Lastly, it is worthy of note that the recent railway agreement concluded at St. Petersburgh at which through rates were arranged on certain classes of goods transported over the South Manchurian and Chinese Eastern railways took, according to a statement attributed to Mr. Tanaka, traffic manager of the South Manchurian line and a member of the conference, and published in the "Manchuria Daily News," no account of pulse and grain. I do not doubt that the report is correct, since grains and beans are the chief articles of transport on these railways, and the Russian authorities in view of the better railway and shipping facilities afforded by the Japanese would have good reason to fear that a through rate on beans would divert considerable quantities of this commodity from the Chinese Eastern to the South Manchurian Railway, while, as regards grain products, the Russians have no desire to encourage at present the export of wheat either to the south of Manchuria or abroad. They wish to foster the local Russian flour mills, and there is already one competitor in the south, namely, the Japanese mill at Tiehling.
I do not desire to exaggerate the importance of the above instances of Japanese progressiveness, some of which may not be thought of any great intrinsic moment; but a straw shows which way the wind blows, and is of greater or less consequence according to the weather which general conditions may incline one to expect.
Having now given some general consideration to the Russo-Japanese agreement of July last and its possible consequences as regards the future relations of one party to the other, it is proposed to invite attention to its bearing upon the attitude of both
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