2
[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.?
about.
As I said in my telegram, rumours of an alarmist character have been flying
Palace coup
d'Elats are freely prophesied, and the guards round the Imperial and Forbidden Cities are reported to have been strengthened. The reactionary party, among whom Prince Yu Lang, the new Grand Councillor, is numbered, have, it is said, pointed out to the Prince Regent how greatly the throne would lose in prestige if he receded from the determined attitude he took up in June, and are advising him to reject the memorial, and then, if trouble ensues, to rely on the Manchu troops, which now garrison the capital, to suppress it. How far this may be true I cannot say, but from conversations I myself have lately had with official members of the Senate and from statements of certain of the provincial members that have been reported to me, I cannot help feeling that the Prince Regent would be well advised. for the sake of the dynasty, in yielding to the cry for the immediate convocation of l'arliament, at all events, so far as to reduce the period fixed for its assembling to at the most two or three years.
It has been openly advocated in the Senate that unless the memorial for the early convening of Parliament be sanctioned by the throne the members will stop work in a body. The provincial assemblics will, it is reported, also stop work if their petitions are rejected. This threatened strike of the national and provincial assemblies at least bears eloquent testimony to the sincerity and earnestness of their members, and it is generally believed that the knowledge of this eventuality and of the even graver consequences that are freely prophesied will cause the Prince Regent to hesitate long before he would dare to refuse the apparently unanimous demand of the country.
I have, &c.
W. G. MAX MÜLLER.
[B]
AFFAIRS OF CHINA.
CONFIDENTIAL.
(
[42454]
(No. 211.) Sir,
со
36747
[November 22.]
REC
SECTION 1.
REGS DEC 10
No. 1.
Mr. Mitchell Innes to Sir Edward Grey.-(Received November 22.)
Washington, November 11, 1910. UP to to-day I had carefully refrained from showing any curiosity in the negotiations which have been going on in China for the issue of an American loan. But the main points of the transaction having already been cabled to the "Times," and to-day being Mr. Knox's weekly reception, I thought the opportunity a good one. while making enquiry on the subject of the loan, to find out whether any sign of irritation on account of past misunderstandings remained, and if so, to repeat to him the assurances which you instructed me to give.
As to the loan, he said that you were already informed of the position of affairs, that the co-operation of English banks had been invited, that 30,000,000 dollars were for currency reform, and the balance, which had been added at the special request of the Chinese Government, were "for Manchuria." He did not know whether an American bank would be created in Manchuria, but that the English, American, and German banks were in communication.
On my expressing a hope that no further incidents would arise which could cause friction between the two countries, he said that certainly nothing of the kind would arise on this occasion, that he regretted nothing more than that any friction should have arisen over the Far East, and in spite of temporary quarrels he felt that the destiny of the two countries lay side by side, and that their friendship was natural and If we had not worked better necessary. He then plunged into his grievances. together in the East hitherto, the British Government was solely to blame. The The Kinchow Railway had never been au American project, but had been given to an Ile had always English firm in compensation for the loss of the Fakumen concession, considered the opposition of Japan to the latter scheme perfectly reasonable, but those objections did not apply to the new concession. It had in no sense been initiated by the United States Government, and indeed he had only consented to support the American bankers in their application for the loan after assuring himself that the scheme would be supported in England.
England had asked that the Japanese wishes should be met by giving her a He had readily consented. Japau was satisfied, and he participation in the loan. was justified in thinking that England would have given her assistance to him. Then Russia had asked for English support in the same way as it had been given to Japan, If, then, and he had offered her the same participation. Yet she was not content. England had remained neutral, he could have understood our position, but we had gone beyond this, and had actively intervened to prohibit China from employing American and British capital in developing her own territory.
You had not, I thought, gone so far as that: you had merely, at the urgent request of Russia, advised China to consult her interests as she had consulted those of Japan. "Not advised," said Mr. Knox, *** warned' was the expression used, and when England warns China, that is tantamount to a prohibition."
And by what right had Russia and Japan intervened to prevent the investment of British and American capital for the development of Manchuria. They had themselves declared by the Treaty of Portsmouth that they had no special interests in Manchuria, and had recognised the full sovereignty of China. They had pledged What sort of an open door was it if they themselves to the policy of the open door. stepped in to prevent a perfectly legitimate enterprise from being carried out? China was anxious to develop Manchuria, and it ought to be developed. If words had any meaning at all, the action of Russia and Japan was unjustified. The existence of the new railway under international supervision would have been the best guarantee of the reality of the open-door policy. Besides there was nothing in the scheme detrimental to the interests of the Japanese or the Russian railway.
[2982 y−1]
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