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these various chiefs, but, in view of the difficulty of obtaining supplies for any length of time, I am of opinion that Tengkeng could scarcely bring more than 500 men, whilst 500 might be raised by the combined forces of Mingkuang, Tien-tang, and Tatang. Such forces would be poorly armed and badly organised, and they would have little eagerness for action.
3. Under the third head the nearest troops to the frontier would be 200 men of the 11th Ying, who are stationed at Kuyung Kai. These men all carry Mauser magazine rifles (nine cartridges), which are in good order, and they are the best of the Tengyuch brigade. Their commandant, Major Ma, is an intelligent Mahommedan, and his men show better discipline and better spirit than is usual with the Chinese forces. The ying includes a number of Kachins (Chashans) from Sansi, who speak a dialect almost identical with that of the Pienma Lashis. The 4th and 5th Ying are stationed at Tengyuch, and comprise together about 500 men, chiefly armed with single-loading Mausers, which are antiquated and in poor condition. They are led by Chinese officers of the old school, and have had no Japanese training, though they show a marked improvement on the troops of a few years ago both in physique and discipline. I had an opportunity a few days ago of witnessing their target practice, and they showed an invariable tendency to shoot low, though I have seen men of the 11th Ying showing excellent marksmanship. Colonel Chiang, one of the officers stationed at Tengyuch, is a man of undoubted energy and courage, reputed a tribesman by birth, and showing a forceful personality which is entirely un-Chinese.
4. There are 1,500 troops at Talifu, and I have information that many of their officers are in reality Japanese, though they speak Chinese fluently, and the greatest secrecy is observed in regard to their nationality. They would be able to reach Hpimaw through Yun-lung Chou, crossing the Mekong by the Feilung Bridge and the Salween by the ferry below Tengkeng. It is probable that they could reach Hpimaw in about the same time as troops from Myitkyina, but I have been unable to gather any reliable information as to their transport and commissariat. Large numbers of mules are, however, constantly available at Talifu, the roads are fair, and local supplies would be obtainable until they crossed the watershed. A detailed account of these troops is given in my despatch of the 3rd March last (printed report, p. 18).
I am of opinion that the Chinese would be unlikely to move up regular troops either under heads (3) or (4) to the unadministered territory, and think that the only probable resistance would come from the Lisu irregulars reported under head (2).
Lines of Advance.
Their are eight possible lines of advance for the Chinese into the unadministered territory, From west to east they are as follows:--
1. From Ku-yung Kai by San Cha-ho, across the watershed near Manung Pum, and into the Shingaw Valley,
2. From Tan-tsa, across the Lang Ya Pass, into the Tummaw Valley.
3. From the Tien-tang Valley by Malipa, across the Pan-wa Pass, to Chang Yin-kou on the Chipway River. Malipa is 8 miles to the south and Chang Yin- kou 6 miles to the north of the pass. This is probably the easiest route from China, Tien-tang being cultivated up to the head of the valley.
4. Along the Mingkuang Valley, striking off at Ta-chai, then up the Cha Shan Ho to Ta Ya-kou Pass-12 miles from Ta-chai. This leads to Hparé, which is 9 miles beyond the pass. This is also a comparatively easy track, and, with No. 3, would probably be open for lightly-laden mules throughout the dry season. Supplies would be abundant right up to the watershed. Lisu porters are generally available throughout this district, and can carry from 60 to 70 lbs. in the baskets on their backs. They are most satisfactory in this capacity, uncomplaining in spite of hard marches and heavy weather, requiring no bedding, as fast as mules, and unfailingly cheerful,
5. Also from Mingkuang. About 5 miles north of Ta-chai, the Hsiao-tang Ho Valley leads off from the main valley to the north-west; the track follows the river and crosses the pass at 10 miles from the Mingkuang Valley, then leads down to Lagwé (Tzu-chu), which is 12 miles to the north of the pass.
6. From Mingkuang, at Ta-chu-pa, across Fen Shui Ling Pass, to Hpimaw, 28 miles. This is the track I followed, but it is regarded as the most difficult, and
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mules should not be taken unless weather conditions are most favourable; they would then need to be very lightly laden, and an advance guard would be necessary to clear the track. Three days' journey, the second very hard, as animals cannot stop all day, owing to the poisonous herbs in the jungle.
7. From the Salween Valley, at Tengkeng, westwards up the Ku-tan Ho Valley, across the pass to Hpimaw; one and a-half days' journey. Difficult track, but open for lightly-laden mules in favourable weather conditions; path very steep and narrow, and difficult streams to cross. The Tengkeng levies would come from this direction, also any troops from Talifu or Yungchang.
8. From the Salween, at Chengka (latitude 26° 15'), by Pai-pa, into the north of territory. This route is little known, and is not likely to be used.
Of the above eight routes, 3, 4, and 7 are those which would in all probability be chosen in the event of any expeditions from the Chinese side. They could all be watched without difficulty, and the main party in the unadministered territory could be kept constantly in touch with news from the passes. This could be arranged from the Burmah side of the watershed more easily than from Tengyueh, as it would be difficult to obtain reliable men among the Chinese, whereas the Kachins proved them- selves during my recent visit to be both eager and quick at gathering and carrying nows. I could arrange for trustworthy information from Talifu and Tengyueh in regard to movements of troops, and possibly also from Ku-yung Kai, but it would be preferable, whenever possible, to use men for intelligence work whose homes are in Burmah, and who would be able to get through to Sima or Sadon in the event of any difficulty with the Tengyueh-Bhamo telegraph line.
ARCHIBALD ROSE,
His Majesty's Acting Consul.
Tengyueh, May 24, 1910.
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