[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.1
CHINA RAILWAYS.
CONFIDENTIAL.
[8730]
No. 1.
458
9850
[January 9.1
APR 101
SECTION 1.
Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.--- (Received January 9.)
(No. 6.) (Telegraphic.) P.
MANCHURIAN railways.
Peking, January 9, 1910,
Having received your telegram, No. 204 of the 28th ultimo, I accompanied my American colleague in a visit to the Japanese Minister on the 31st December. We informed Mr. juin of the instructions from our respective Governments, under which we were to press upon the Chinese Government the desirability of admitting the Japanese to participation in the Chinchow-Aigum Railway. Mr. Ijuin expressed his hearty approval.
At an interview which Mr. Fletcher and myself had yesterday with Liang Tun Yen, I confined myself strictly to the letter of your instructions, merely advocating the admission of the Japanese to participation in the Chinchow-Aigun Railway.
Mr. Fletcher, on his side, spoke at length on the American proposals already communicated to the Wai-wu Pu on the 20th and 31st ultimo, and urged the adoption of his last proposal, by which the end aimed at by the more comprehensive scheme would be gradually attained through general participation of the Powers in the Chinchow-Aigun line.
In reply, Liang declared that though there still remained the question of some minor details, his Government had come to the definite decision to undertake the Chinchow-Aigun Railway project under the preliminary Anglo-American Agreement. The suggested participation of other Powers in that project was not a question on which he could express an opinion on behalf of his Government. Japanese and Russian participation would depend on those Powers either agreeing to the general American proposal for the neutralisation of all the railways, or else making some concession to the Chinese in return. He was personally of opinion that the success of the American proposals depended to a great extent on Ilis Majesty's Government, and he attached great importance to the effect which our attitude on the subject might produce on the Japanese Government.
I would have, I think, had greater hopes of a successful issue to the American negotiations, if, as I understand you suggested, the United States Government had postponed submitting their general scheme for neutralisation until after the Chinese Government had been induced to admit Japan to participation in the Chinchow- Aigun Railway.
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