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proposal which he had submitted to the Chinese Government on the 20th December referred only to the more comprehensive scheme for the neutralisation of Manchurian railways, and did not mention the Chinchow-Aigun project, which would be "held in This would also reserve until it was seen how the larger proposal was received.” appear to have been the procedure followed in St. Petersburgh by Mr. Rockhill. The American Ambassador here informed me that he had given a copy of the proposal, as he had received it from his Government, and after he had presented it to the Japanese Government, to his Russian colleague, who some days later had come to him and pointed out that the American representative in St. Petersburgh appeared to have received different instructions from himself, for in the St. Petersburgh proposal no mention had been made of the Chinchow-Aigun railway. M. Malewsky, the Russian colleague in question, gave it to me as his opinion that American diplomacy had
He added, grievously blundered.
"at any rate the Americans have made the Japanese and ourselves closer friends than ever."
I have, &c.
CLAUDE M. MACDONALD.
Enclosure in No. 1.
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Copy of Letter communicuted to American Ambassador in Tokyo by Japanese Government. (Strictly Confidential.) (Translation.)
M. l'Ambassadeur,
Tokyo, January 21, 1910.
THE note which your Excellency did me the honour of addressing to me under date of the 18th altimo, in reference to the internationalisation and administration of railways in Manchuria, was duly received, and has had, it is scarcely necessary to add, the most serious attention of the Government of His Majesty the Emperor.
The Imperial Government are well aware that the proposal of the United States is entirely disinterested, and that it has for its single inspiration a desire to promote what your Excellency's Government conceives to be the best interests of China, and · I beg you to accept my assurance that the Imperial Government upholding in all sincerity as they do the integrity of the Chinese Empire, and the principle of equal opportunity in all parts of China, would unhesitatingly lend their undivided support to the project if they could bring themselves to the conclusion that its realisation would accomplish the result desired.
The relations of friendship and good understanding which have so long existed between our two countries, and the common desire of both that nothing may be permitted to weaken the sentiments of mutual good-will and confidence, afford, I am happy to believe, ample assurance that a frank exposition of the reasons, which prevent my Government from giving their support to the scheme, will not be misunderstood or misconstrued.
The most serious objection to the proposal in question lies in the fact that it contemplates a very important departure from the terms of the Treaty of Portsmouth, That treaty was designed to establish in Manchuria a stable and permanent order of things, and the Imperial Government firmly believe that in a strict and loyal adhesion to its provisions are to be found the highest guarantees of enduring peace and repose in this part of the world, and of the orderly advancement of Manchuria. Not the least difficult of the many difficult and important problems that were definitively solved at Portsmouth, was the question of railways. That adjustment subsequently received the deliberate confirmation of the Chinese Government in the Treaty of Peking, and the railway operations now carried on in Southern Manchuria are consistent with the original concessions, which were with equal deliberation granted by the same Power.
Nor can the Imperial Government see in the present condition of things in Manchuria anything so exceptional as to make it necessary or desirable to set up there an exceptional system not required in other parts of China. There is nothing in the actual situation in that region so far as the Imperial Government are aware which exceptionally interferes with the undisturbed enjoyment by China of her political rights. So far as the question of open door is concerned, the principle of equal opportunity possesses in its application to Manchuria a more comprehensive significance than it has elsewhere in China, since in virtue of article 7 of the Treaty
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of Portsmouth, the Japanese and Russian railways in those provinces are dedicated exclusively to commercial and industrial uses. Finally, in the matter of railway administration it is impossible for the Imperial Government to believe that the substitution of an international in place of a national régime would prove advantageous or beneficial.
On the contrary, it seems to them that in the presence of such a system, economy and efficiency would, in the nature of things, be obliged to yield to political exigencies, and that the divided responsibility of the system would inevitably mean an absence of due responsibility to the serious disadvantage of the public and the detriment of the service.
These are the principal reasons why the project under consideration does not commend itself to the favourable consideration of the Imperial Government, But there are other cogent reasons which cannot be ignored.
In the regions affected by the Japanese railways in Manchuria there have grown up numerous Japanese industrial and commercial undertakings which owe their inception, as they owe their continued existence, to the fact that the Imperial Government, possessing the railways in question, are able to extend to those enterprises and to the persons engaged in them, due protection and defence against attack and pillage by lawless bands that still infest the country. In the development of these activities, which are contributing in such a marked degree to the prosperity and progress of Manchuria, large numbers of Japanese subjects and large sums of Japanese money are enlisted, and the Imperial Government could not in good faith or with a due sense of their responsibility, consent to surrender the means by which such protection and defence are alone made possible.
The observations which I now have the honour to present to your Excellency, and which I venture to hope may prove as convincing to your Excellency's Government as they are conclusive to my own, have reference to the plan in its wider sense, but they are, I should add, no less applicable to the scheme in its more restricted form, since the two plans are, in principle, the same, and only differ in degree.
In conclusion, I wish to express to your Excellency the sincere appreciation of my Government for the courteous intimation of the United States concerning the projected Chinchow-Aigun line, and to say that, in principle, the Imperial Government will be prepared to participate in the enterprise with the other Powers interested in the question. But as that question is clearly distinguishable from the main subject of your Excellency's note, I will, with your permission, reserve this minor point for separate and independent attention when the necessary details regarding the matter are known.
I avail, &c.
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